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NY BigLaw
Partner Hit With $372,000
Sanction, Five Year Suspension
By Leigh Jones
The National Law Journal
New York Lawyer
June 15, 2009
A federal appeals court
has upheld a $372,000 sanction against a
Crowell & Moring partner and affirmed his five-year suspension
from practice in bankruptcy court in a big swath of Florida.
Peter R. Ginsberg,
a white-collar defense attorney in Washington, D.C.-based Crowell &
Moring's New York office and a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, lost
his appeal of the sanctions on Thursday in the 11th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals. A three-judge panel found that Ginsberg's attempts
to have a bankruptcy judge recuse himself from a Chapter 11 case
were in bad faith.
The appeals court affirmed
the $371,517 monetary sanction imposed by the judge whom Ginsberg
attempted to oust and upheld the judge's suspension of Ginsberg's
license to practice for five years in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Florida. The district extends from the
Georgia border to Florida's southwest coast and includes
Jacksonville, Orlando and Tampa, Fla.
Ginsberg, reached by phone
on Friday, said that he was disappointed in the decision. "We
believe we properly represented our client against an abusive
situation in the Florida court," Ginsberg said.
The sanction stemmed from
the bankruptcy of Evergreen Security Inc., which, according to
Thurday's decision, the bankruptcy court deemed was part of a Ponzi
scheme. Ginsberg represented one of principals of Evergreen, who in
2006 was found liable for $8 million for receiving fraudulent
transfers of Evergreen's assets. U.S Bankruptcy Judge Arthur B.
Briskman presided over the Evergreen case.
Following the judgment
against Ginsberg's client, Ginsberg sought Briskman's recusal,
alleging that the judge was not impartial. Specifically, Ginsberg
alleged that Briskman engaged in misconduct in another case
involving one of the Evergreen defendants and that he participated
in ex parte communications with the attorney representing Evergreen.
Ginsberg also alleged professional misconduct by Evergreen's
attorney.
Briskman, who presided over
the recusal motion and the sanctions hearings, found that Ginsberg
failed to establish any legal or factual support for the allegations
and that he had filed the recusal motion as a delay tactic.
In affirming Briskman's
decision, the appeals panel found that Ginsberg's conduct was
"egregious" and included overzealous litigation tactics and factual
inaccuracies. The panel also found that he demonstrated
disrespectful behavior and bad faith. The panel noted that
Ginsberg's first comments to Briskman during the recusal hearing
were, "Your honor has compromised my health, your honor has
compromised my immune system."
The appeals panel found
that "Ginsberg was extremely difficult to deal with and
disrespectful to the court," and that "he refused to answer the
court's questions, treated the court as an adversary and continually
made inflammatory statements."
The panel determined that
the monetary sanctions, based on the attorney fees incurred by the
Evergreen Security, were appropriate, and that the five-year
suspension from practicing in a Florida bankruptcy court was
reasonable for a New York attorney.
Ginsberg joined Crowell &
Moring in 2007. He was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York for seven years and previously practiced at
Gold & Wachtell in Washington. He holds a law degree from Columbia
Law School and a master of science degree from the London School of
Economics and Political Science.
He has not determined his
next step in the Evergreen case, he said.
The judges in In Re:
Evergreen Security v. Ginsberg, No. 6:08cv00046, were Stanley
F. Birch Jr., Frank M. Hull and Peter T. Fay, who wrote the
decision.
Famous
Lawyer Loses Fight for Right to Criticize Judges
By Ed White
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
January 21, 2009
A federal appeals court threw out a lawsuit Tuesday by Geoffrey
Fieger, who claims his criticism of Michigan judges is protected by
the First Amendment.
The court, in a 2-1
decision, overturned a significant ruling that had gone in Fieger's
favor in a long-running clash between the outspoken and often
unbridled trial lawyer and the Michigan judiciary.
Fieger got in hot water in
1999 when he gave a blistering critique of three state judges who
reversed a $15 million malpractice verdict against his client.
"I declare war on you," he
said on a radio show -- and much more.
The Michigan Supreme Court
said Fieger violated rules of professional conduct. But a federal
judge in Detroit found the civility rules overly broad and
unconstitutional.
The 6th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals has reversed that ruling, saying, in part, that Fieger
can't show any harm from a reprimand.
And the "threat of future
injury arising from a general desire to criticize the Michigan
judiciary is significantly diminished" by the state Supreme Court's
narrow rules, the 6th Circuit said.
"The Michigan Supreme Court
emphasized that Fieger violated the rules, not because he criticized
judges, but because he made vulgar, personally abusive comments
about participants in a pending case," the appeals court said.
Fieger said the judges who
reversed his medical-malpractice verdict were "three jackass ...
judges." He likened them to Nazi leaders and said Judge Jane Markey
was "Eva Braun," wife of Adolf Hitler.
Fieger agreed to a
reprimand while reserving his right to go to court to challenge
certain rules of professional conduct for Michigan lawyers. A
message seeking comment was left at his office Tuesday.
In a dissent, Judge Gilbert
Merritt of the 6th Circuit said there's nothing "narrow" about
Michigan's rules for lawyers.
"Comparing judges to Hitler
and Goebbels evidently falls on the wrong side of the line," he
said. "But would it be permissible to ... say that the judges
'behaved dictatorially?'
"Saying that a judge is a
'jackass' appears to be impermissible -- despite the fact that the
word is a non-vulgar name for a donkey," Merritt wrote.
"But would it be
permissible," he added, "to vary the 'form and manner' and say that
he is a 'stubborn idiot,' a 'right-wing radical,' a 'doctrinaire
ideologue' or 'driven by party politics?'"
Former Michigan Supreme
Court Chief Justice Cliff Taylor, who in 2006 wrote the 4-3 opinion
reprimanding Fieger, said he was trying to address conduct "at the
very center" of incivility.
"I want lawyers to speak
about what the court has done professionally, not as vulgar backroom
brawlers," Taylor
"Witch"
Glitch: Attorney Argues His Blog
Post About Judge Was Protected Speech
By Jordana Mishory
Daily Business Review
New York Lawyer
July 16,2008
Fort Lauderdale, Fla., criminal defense attorney Sean Conway
agreed he was in the wrong when he called a controversial Broward
judge an "evil, unfair witch" and "seemingly mentally ill" two
Halloweens ago.
But following the
intervention of the Florida Supreme Court, Conway is attempting to
get his conditional guilty plea tossed on the basis that the First
Amendment protected his comments.
An attorney should be able
to have some liberty in expression and not face disciplinary action,
lawyers argued in Florida Supreme Court briefs.
"Questioning a judge's
qualifications for an elected position lies at the core of our First
Amendment freedoms," the American Civil Liberties Union wrote
on behalf of Conway.
He faces Florida Bar
discipline for writing disparaging comments about controversial
Broward Circuit Judge Cheryl Aleman on a popular law blog.
But a deal with the Bar requiring a guilty plea in exchange for a
public reprimand was called into question last month by the state's
high court.
The justices directed both
parties to file briefs by Monday on whether his comments are
protected speech under the First Amendment.
The court raised the speech
issue but also has been pushing for greater professionalism in the
legal community.
In several recent cases,
the Supreme Court has stiffened suggested penalties in an effort to
make the point that it's getting tough on lawyer misconduct.
Conway and the ACLU, which
filed an amicus brief, contend his comments on JAABlog were
exaggerated opinions, which are constitutionally protected.
"On Halloween 2006, the
respondent referred to Judge Aleman as a mean-spirited witch,"
Conway's attorney b wrote. "His comment that Judge Aleman was a
'witch' is an example of figurative speech."
Wrubel also noted the
limiting word "seemingly" in Conway's phrase about mental illness
"falls squarely into the category of cautionary terms" and should be
protected by the First Amendment. Both Conway and ACLU attorneys
Randall Marshall and Maria Kayanan defended Conway's remarks as
permissible hyperbole.
Aleman did not respond to a
call for comment by deadline.
Wrubel said Conway was
exercising a freedom exulted by founding father James Madison, and
the court should reject his client's guilty plea and dismiss the Bar
complaint.
In an interview, Conway
said he pleaded guilty out of concern for the outcome in his case.
"With so many years of
stagnant, unchanged, old-school policy, I had no faith that justice
would make an appearance in my case in a South Florida courtroom,"
Conway said. Conway also pointed to the fact that Aleman had changed
the policy that he blogged about, so he had accomplished the goal of
his posting and now needed to move on with his life.
Wrubel said in an interview
that just because Conway admitted in writing that he violated a Bar
rule doesn't mean that he actually did. The ACLU of Florida
contended the Bar's case against Conway "imperils the core values of
the Constitution."
And the Supreme Court,
which brought up the free speech question on its own, was also
apparently troubled. In its order to show cause, the justices
directed both parties to address "whether any of the respondent's
comments should be considered protected speech under the First
Amendment."
The Florida Bar did not see
it the same way. Asserting the practice of law is a privilege, the
Bar contended free speech rights don't shield an attorney from
discipline. The Bar argued Conway did not have any reasonable
objective basis to support inappropriate comments about a member of
the judiciary. Conway, "as an officer of the court, made statements
that directly attacked the qualifications or integrity of a judge,"
the Bar wrote.
He was accused of violating
Bar rules forbidding attorneys from impugning the qualifications of
a judge and making statements known to be false or in reckless
disregard to the truth. But attorneys claim that you cannot measure
the truth of hyperbole.
Nova Southeastern
University constitutional law professor Robert Jarvis, who is
not involved with the case, said Conway's statements don't mean that
Aleman casts spells, wears black hats or flies on a broomstick. He
said that just because a theater critic says a play is the worst
show ever doesn't mean it's true. He said most readers would know
that the critic had not seen and judged every play ever created but
could say it for dramatic effect.
The Bar noted Conway agreed
to a conditional guilty plea that hinged on him acknowledging his
remarks about Aleman were either false or made with reckless
disregard. But that does not mean the justices have an obligation to
accept the Bar's findings. The Supreme Court has the final word.
Jarvis said the high
court's order to show cause indicates that the justices want to take
a closer look at this issue instead of rubberstamping the Bar's
findings. Jarvis called this case a "no brainer."
"Lawyers are people, too,"
Jarvis said. "If you cut us, do we not bleed? And just because you
become a lawyer doesn't mean you give up your First Amendment
rights."
However, he added that
Conway's colorful language on the blog diminished his criticisms. He
said Conway should have turned to more tangible facts to criticize
Aleman than name-calling. Conway also is in trouble for saying
Aleman had an "ugly, condescending attitude," was "unfit for her
position" and there was "nothing honorable about that malcontent."
In his brief, Conway
claimed his statements were all protected opinions rather than
false. His comments surfaced in a blog posting claiming Aleman
forced defendants to waive their right to a speedy trial by setting
trials just a few weeks after arraignment.
Aleman is one of Broward's
most controversial judges -- making headlines since she was sworn in
more than six years ago. The 4th District Court of Appeal overturned
her in several high-profile cases for overstepping the "wide
latitude" afforded judges and sentencing a defendant in excess of
the statutory maximum. Last February, the Judicial Qualifications
Commission, which regulates judges, filed formal charges against
Aleman for threatening to hold or holding attorneys in contempt of
court and not removing herself from cases where she had prior
problems with attorneys.
The state JQC recommended
she receive a public reprimand for engaging in a pattern of arrogant
and discourteous conduct. She appealed the ruling to the court,
which has not weighed in yet. Both Conway and ACLU attorneys
maintained Conway was exposing a potential problem in Aleman's
courtroom. If Conway were sanctioned, the ACLU contended his First
Amendment rights -- and the rights of the public -- would be
trampled.
Both Conway and the ACLU
noted a 2001 disciplinary case cited in the Supreme Court's order to
show cause. The justices in the old case noted attorneys "play an
important role in exposing valid problems within the judicial
system." Attorneys should only be prohibited from making false
statements that would "erode public confidence" without publicizing
"problems that legitimately deserve attention."
Conway and the ACLU said
the Bar never challenged Conway's account of what happened in
Aleman's courtroom, and his referee never conducted any evidentiary
hearings to vet the truthfulness of Conway's claims. They argued his
comments can be seen only as opinion because the referee never found
that Conway lied about what happened.
The ACLU went a step
further saying that even if Conway's statements were false, they
should not violate the Bar rules unless Conway knew what he was
saying was wrong or reckless. "In short, Judge Aleman's rulings
provided the respondent with an objectively reasonable basis in fact
to express the opinions which he posted the following day on JAABlog,"
Wrubel wrote.
The Bar countered that the
reason the claims were never vetted was because of Conway's plea
agreement. The Bar also claimed his intent was not to expose a wrong
but to lash out at Aleman. He "never sought redress by any other
means other than posting his blog on the Internet," the Bar wrote.
"The respondent never sought judicial review of the judge's
continuance policy through an appeal nor did he file any complaint
of judicial misconduct with the appropriate agency." Conway said he
filed a Judicial Qualifications Commission complaint against Aleman
and interviewed with the JQC's special counsel who was prosecuting
Ale>man.
Conway said he is shocked
that the Bar would misrepresent that in a brief, when they could
easily check with the JQC. However, the state Constitution maintains
that JQC complaints are confidential until probable cause is found
against the judge. Citing case law, the Bar said courts have ruled
vile attacks and angry outbursts "by their very nature are likely to
indicate a reckless disregard for the truth of what is being said
and not protected free speech under the First Amendment." The Bar
pointed to a 2003 Minnesota case where that state's Supreme Court
rejected the argument that a lawyer had a First Amendment right to
state a judge won election to the bench "by appealing to racism."
The court wrote, "merely cloaking an assertion of fact as an opinion
does not give the assertion constitutional protection."
The Bar also cited a 2000
case where the Delaware Supreme Court found that a lawyer's
statements claiming a judge "suffered a progressive mental
disability" causing "mood swings and injudicious conduct" was not
protected because they were made with reckless disregard to the
truth. The Bar pointed to Conway's comments that Aleman was
"seemingly mentally ill," saying that he did not have the medical
background to make such a claim.
Fieger
Wins, and Campaign Cash Still Rules
Editorial
Free Press of Detroit
June 4, 2008
Campaign finance laws exist
for two reasons: one, to ensure disclosure of the influence of money
on the political process; and two, to soften the effects of that
influence by enacting limits on contributions and other restraints.
There is no doubt that
Southfield attorney Geoffrey Fieger completely subverted those aims
when he essentially laundered through employees of his law firm
hefty contributions to the 2004 presidential campaign of John
Edwards.
But can you make a federal
case out of it? A U.S. District Court jury didn't think so, refusing
Monday to convict Fieger and law partner Vernon (Ven) Johnson of
doing anything illegal. So congratulations to Fieger for gaming the
system and then beating it.
But that doesn't make what
he did right.
The problems with money and
politics should, by now, be quite clear. Too much of the political
process is dictated by who has money, who gives it and how public
policy decisions are made with respect to the money trail. Right
now, we're in the midst of the most expensive presidential campaign
in history, which will be true only until the next one, four years
from now.
Campaigns on the merits, in
which the candidate with the strongest ideas wins, regardless of
financial backing, are a pipe dream.
The obvious solution is
some sort of public financing that puts everyone on equal footing.
Remove private money from the process altogether and let the
candidate have at each other on the issues.
No surprise, there's tons
of moneyed opposition to such a system. And there are constitutional
questions looming over any mandatory public finance system that
prohibits contributions, which are still deemed a form of political
expression, though they often seem more like naked commerce.
But even without such stark
reforms, the system ought to have some integrity, and the limits
established by law ought to be enforced. Fieger got around them by
being clever, pleading ignorance, then getting a jury to see it his
way. It certainly helped that the local U.S. attorney's office had
been frighteningly aggressive in its pursuit of Fieger, and that he
had the cash to hire an attorney who reputedly has never lost a
case. Yes, money matters in criminal justice at least as much as it
does in politics.
No doubt, Fieger's
acquittal gives a little more mettle to other fat cats who want to
skirt the law. It's a victory for him, but a step back for the
political process.
Fieger
Is Cleared in Campaign Fund Case
Lawyer Was
'Scared to Death' of Guilty Verdict
Paul Egan and Doug Guthrie
The Detroit News
June 3, 2008
DETROIT --
Southfield attorney Geoffrey Fieger and his celebrity attorney,
Gerry Spence, embraced and kissed jurors on the courthouse steps
Monday after they acquitted Fieger and his law partner Ven Johnson
of all criminal charges.
The joyous scene outside
the federal courthouse in Detroit contrasted sharply with the mood
inside, where federal prosecutors left U.S. District Judge Paul D.
Borman's courtroom after being handed a major defeat in a
high-profile case. "We're very disappointed," said Assistant U.S.
Attorney Lynn Helland.
Fieger, 57, and Johnson,
46, were indicted by a federal grand jury last year on conspiracy
and illegal campaign contribution charges, accused of illegally
reimbursing more than $100,000 in political donations made by
employees, employee relatives and law firm vendors to the 2004
presidential campaign of Democrat John Edwards. Fieger also was
charged with obstruction of justice, a 10-year felony.
The acquittals represent
the latest in a string of high-profile setbacks for the U.S.
Attorney's Office in Detroit and the U.S. Justice Department,
including the voluntary reversal in 2004 of convictions won in the
"sleeper cell" terrorism trial, the acquittal of former Macomb
County Prosecutor Carl Marlinga in 2006 and the acquittal of former
federal prosecutor Richard Convertino in 2007.
After more than 18 hours of
deliberations spanning four days, jury foreman Scott Duquette, a
Macomb Township auto technician, stood in a packed courtroom and
pronounced "not guilty" verdicts on all 10 counts.
"I hope this will put an
end to political prosecutions in the age of Mr. Bush," Fieger said,
referring to the U.S. president whose administration he accused of
targeting him.
The key issue in the case
was whether Fieger and Johnson knowingly broke the law. Fieger took
the stand in his own defense, telling jurors he carefully researched
the law and concluded the reimbursements were legal.
"I was scared to death,"
Fieger said after the verdict. "It would have been the end of my
career. It would have been the end of my family as I know it. It
would have been the end and I would have gone to prison."
Prosecutors alleged
Fieger's firm illegally reimbursed donations to Edwards campaign
totaling $127,000, a figure that was adjusted downward to $113,000
at the end of the trial.
Jurors said they decided to
acquit Johnson last week and eventually reached a unanimous decision
that the government never proved a case against Fieger, either.
Juror Al Rollins, 51, said
he believed politics played a part in the decision to go after
Fieger. Congress should make it more clear what is legal and what
isn't, he said.
"The government was after
them and they didn't do a very good job of it," Rollins said. "He (Fieger)
clearly didn't know what he did was illegal. He thought it was
legal."
Another juror, Burlrando
Pearce, said he began jury deliberations Wednesday believing Fieger
should be convicted but eventually came around to the majority view
and voted for acquittal.
He and other jurors said
discussions sometimes became heated to the point they believed they
could be heard outside the jury room.
"It was kind of volatile," said
Pearce, a 33-year-old autoworker who said he is satisfied with the
verdict ultimately reached. "It was unforgettable," he said. "It's
something I don't ever want to go through again."
Jury: Feds Didn't Prove Case
Duquette and most other
jurors interviewed said they didn't know if the prosecution was
politically motivated but did not believe the government proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial began April 24
and heard 18 days of evidence.
Fieger was a 1998
Democratic candidate for governor who rose to prominence in the
1990s representing assisted suicide advocate Jack Kevorkian.
Fieger alleged he was the
victim of a partisan Republican U.S. Justice Department, a charge
Helland denied.
Spence, 79, the legendary
Wyoming attorney who announced during his closing argument that the
Fieger case would be his last, hugged jurors outside the courthouse,
telling Duquette that he was the one juror Spence did not feel he
could get a read on which way he was leaning.
"I knew this jury would
never convict," Spence said after the verdict. "They were a good,
solid American jury and the evidence wasn't there."
Spence, who has written
several books on criminal defense, defended former Philippine first
lady Imelda Marcos, Idaho separatist Randy Weaver in the Ruby Ridge
case, and the family of corporate whistle-blower Karen Silkwood.
Spence boasts he has never
lost a criminal case and it appears he will now retire with his
record intact.
West Bloomfield labor
attorney Lester Owczarski, a former state administrative law judge
who sat through most of the trial, said prosecutors failed to
present a case jurors could care about. "It was too much inside
baseball ... this thing was just too technical," he said of the
Fieger case.
Steve Fishman, Johnson's
Detroit attorney, admitted to jurors his initial confidence in an
acquittal began to wane as the deliberations dragged on. Fishman
told Duquette jurors they could have saved Johnson grief by
returning his "not guilty" verdicts last week and continuing to
deliberate over Fieger.
Feds: Case is Not
Political
The frequently bombastic Fieger, who
has used harsh language to castigate former Michigan Gov. John
Engler and state appellate judges, was relatively reserved in his
comments following the verdict, mostly expressing gratitude to the
jurors who acquitted him.
But Johnson, Fieger's partner,
filled the temporary void, denouncing the federal grand jury system
as a secret "star chamber" that facilitated a "witch hunt" and needs
a total overhaul. "This case proves it," Johnson said.
"I will fully investigate a
malicious prosecution claim against these prosecutors of the U.S.
government for what they've done to us," Johnson said.
The trial heard evidence that the 80
federal agents who searched parts of Fieger's Southfield law offices
and questioned Fieger employees on Nov. 30, 2005, represented the
largest such force ever assembled for a campaign finance case.
But Helland noted Borman rejected
defense claims that the case was political.
"This was not in the least a
politically motivated prosecution," he said. "The case was handled
from the beginning by line level attorneys working with line level
discretion and established guidelines."
An unusually large number of FBI
agents were needed on the night of the raid because it was an
unusual case that required a lot of people to be interviewed in a
hurry, he said.
"Very few crimes have this many
participants," Helland said. "We needed to talk to them before they
could get their stories straight."
Immediately after the verdict,
Fieger kissed his wife, Keenie, who wept.
"This has felt like a bad dream,"
she said. "It's like we've been held prisoner all this time and now,
suddenly, we are free again. I think it's clear that the jurors
recognized what was going on."
Famous
Lawyer, Partner on Trial
Dodging Campaign Finance Laws
By David Runk
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
April 24, 2008
DETROIT (AP) _ A federal
prosecutor says outspoken lawyer Geoffrey Fieger and a law
partner knowingly dodged campaign finance laws to boost
contributions to Democrat John Edwards' 2004 presidential campaign.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Lynn Helland
delivered his opening argument Thursday in the trial of Fieger and
Ven Johnson.
Both men have denied the
charges. Their lawyers are scheduled to deliver their opening
statements later in the day in Detroit federal court.
Helland told the jury the
case was about illegal fundraising. He says both defendants "took
steps to try to make these illegal contributions look legal."
The 56-year-old Fieger and
46-year-old Johnson are accused of making $127,000 in illegal
contributions to Edwards' 2004 campaign
Tarzana attorney Richard
Fine is charged with
moral turpitude with a recommendation by California State
Bar Court Judge Richard Honn that Fine be disbarred, the Los
Angeles Daily News reports.
Honn alleges in
state bar documents that Fine "filed meritless lawsuits" to
retaliate against judges who ruled against him. Fine alleged
L.A. Superior Court judges hadn't disclosed the nearly $40,000
paid to them annually by the county, on top of their salary, in
cases where the county was a party.
Fine argued his case at
state Supreme Court, who haven't ruled yet.
Fine told the Daily
News that the state bar began action against him because he
filed cases against judges - rather than his earlier cases
against the state legislature and governor. According to the
newspaper, "legal observers say the case against Fine is
unusual." What do you think?
The
state Court of Appeal in San Diego will hear oral arguments in
February in a
lawsuit,
filed by Judicial Watch alleging the nearly $40,000 given by
the county to judges as a extra benefit are a gift and waste of
public funds.
Bar Rules
Should Protect Rights, Not Judges
Michael Mayo
South Florida Sun-Sentinel.com
January 6, 2008
The nerve of attorney Sean
Conway, who faces disciplinary action from the Florida Bar for
calling Broward Circuit Judge Cheryl Aleman an "evil, unfair witch"
in an October 2006 Internet posting.
Where did he think he was, a free country with a First Amendment?
Nope. He's in Florida, where the Bar has been lowered with overly
restrictive rules that protect judges at the expense of attorneys'
freedom
Free Speech Advocate Conway
speech
For sure, Conway's post on a local judicial Web site (http://jaablog.jaablaw.com)
was crude and inflammatory. While criticizing Aleman for setting
trial dates for two weeks after arraignment, he called her
"seemingly mentally ill" and wrote that "she is clearly unfit for
her position."
He said he doesn't regret the strong language. "Defendant's right to
a fair trial was being trampled on," Conway said Friday. "I thought
it was my duty to expose it.... If I used other words, the situation
might not have gotten the attention it deserved. I believe it got
the message across, because her policy changed the next week."
But the message has put his livelihood at risk.
Conway's blog post triggered an investigation by the Florida Bar's
grievance committee, which in November found probable cause that he
violated five Bar rules, including impugning the qualifications and
integrity of a judge.
Conway could be reprimanded, fined, suspended or disbarred for his
actions.
"This has put more stress on me than I want to deal with," said
Conway, 36. "I want to go back to running a small, one-person firm.
I don't even have a secretary."
He said he's heard from lawyers all over, including one in Ohio
suspended six months and fined $18,000 by the Ohio Bar for
denigrating a judge.
Part of Conway wants the matter to go away by reaching some sort of
settlement. But another part wants to fight for the bigger
principles, seeing as how the Florida Bar is a branch of the Florida
Supreme Court.
"The right of every lawyer to expose injustice is at stake," Conway
said. "The Bill of Rights is at stake. And my license to practice
law is at stake."
Last year, a U.S. district court in Michigan found that state's Bar
rules overly restrictive in a case involving an attorney who called
judges "Nazis" in a radio interview.
Wrote U.S. District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow: "The vague and overbroad
courtesy provisions that enforce silence in the name of preserving
the dignity of the bench does not override an attorney's right to
speak her mind against public institutions, especially an elected
judiciary, regardless of whether that speech is in good taste."
Most state bars have rules prohibiting attorneys from making
statements that undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Conway
agrees that lawyers shouldn't be allowed to make reckless
allegations about judges. "I shouldn't be able to just spout off
that so-and-so is on the take," Conway said. "But in this case I was
trying to protect my clients."
Aleman, meanwhile, has been transferred from criminal to civil cases
and awaits the outcome of a recent hearing by the state Judicial
Qualifications Commission for possible misconduct in other cases.
Morrie Levine, a Hollywood attorney who was chairman of the Florida
Bar grievance committee when it found probable cause against Conway,
said the committee was aware of the Michigan ruling but thought it
was legally irrelevant in Florida.
"We followed Florida law and Florida Bar rules in making our
decision," Levine said. "Whether the rules are overly broad or
restrictive on free speech is not up to us.... I'm proud of our
committee."e
Levine said this was the first case he was aware of involving the
Internet.
The irony is if Conway hid behind anonymity or a pseudonym, as most
Internet posters do, he probably wouldn't have gotten in trouble.
"My nature is not to hide," Conway said.
By being a stand-up person and putting his name to his post, he's
opened himself to harsh consequences.
Where's the justice in that?
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/broward/sfl-flbmayocol0106sbjan06,0,6957463.column?coll=sofla_tab01_layout
Attorney
Who Called Judge an
"Evil Unfair Witch" on Blog Fights Ethics Probe
New York Lawyer
December 20, 2007
By Jordana Mishory
Daily Business Review
Do lawyers check their free
speech rights at the courthouse steps?
That's exactly what some
are wondering after it was disclosed that a criminal defense
attorney is facing Florida Bar ethics charges for critical comments
he posted
on a Web log about a
controversial Broward, Fla., judge.
A number of constitutional
experts claim attorneys give up the full force of the First
Amendment when they join the Bar, but other lawyers say they have
every right to speak their mind.
The debate resurfaced after
the Bar found probable cause against Fort Lauderdale, Fla., criminal
defense attorney Sean Conway for calling Broward Circuit Judge
Cheryl Aleman an "evil, unfair witch" who is "seemingly mentally
ill" on a blog about the courthouse. Formal charges against Conway
are pending.
Bar rules ban attorneys
from making statements that impugn the integrity of a judge or the
judiciary. Attorneys who violate the rules of professional conduct
could face discipline ranging from a reprimand to disbarment.
Conway's attorney, Fred
Haddad, claims the First Amendment protects his client's online
comments posted on
JAABlog in October 2006. The
post criticized Aleman for allegedly forcing defendants in her
courtroom to choose between the right to a speedy trial and the
right to a well-prepared defense.
The controversial judge is
facing her own disciplinary proceedings.
Haddad said Conway's
situation is "absolutely absurd."
"You don't give up any
constitutional rights when you become a lawyer," he said. "A lawyer
has an obligation to educate the public. The choice of words is
immaterial."
Attorney Louis Jepeway Jr.,
who represents lawyers before the Bar, said Conway should not be
facing any sanctions. "Lawyers aren't second-class citizens," he
said. "It is unfortunate the judge is so sensitive, but it's not a
reason to violate [Conway's] First Amendment rights."
The Bar's Fort Lauderdale
office, which found probable cause against Conway, did not return a
call for comment by deadline Wednesday.
But several constitutional
experts said an attorney's ability to speak about a judge ends when
the statements cross from criticism about a judge's conduct or
decisions to a personal attack. The intent is to ensure public
confidence in the judiciary and the courts system, but it could
undermine public trust in court operations.
Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, a
Miami attorney and a former president Miami chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union, said the Bar can mandate ethical rules as a
condition for admission, and the rules can limit First Amendment
rights. "The practice of law is considered a privilege," Rodriguez-Taseff
said. "When lawyers choose to be admitted to the practice of law,
they do so because they know they have to abide by rules of conduct
of The Bar."
Rodriguez-Taseff, who
declined to comment specifically about Conway's case, said the rules
aren't designed to muzzle attorneys. She said attorneys are still
able to comment on the qualifications of judges and the merit of
legal rulings. "The Bar can regulate the decorum in which you
express opinions," the Duane Morris partner said. "As lawyers, we
have to be careful that in seeking to bring unfairness to the
forefront that we do so in a manner that elevates the profession."
Nova Southeastern
University law professor Robert Jarvis, who teaches classes in
constitutional and ethics issues, echoed Rodriguez-Taseff's position
that the Florida Bar has a right to limit First Amendment rights as
a condition of a law license. Jarvis said attorneys can talk about
the qualifications of the judiciary but shouldn't resort to
name-calling.
Conway should have turned
to the chief judge or Judicial Qualifications Commission if he
believed Aleman's actions were wrong, Jarvis said. Conway said he
filed a JQC complaint against Aleman."The purple prose is designed
to inflame the passion of the public against this judge, which has
the effect of inflaming the passion of the public against all
judges," Jarvis said.
Both Jarvis and Rodriguez-Taseff
note the Bar has the power to limit lawyers' commercial speech in
advertising and client recruitment.
Florida has one of the
nation's most stringent rules regulating attorney advertising.
Attorney Barry Richard, a partner at Greenberg Traurig in
Tallahassee who has advised the Bar in disciplinary appeals, said
the Bar rarely reviews claims of attorneys bad-mouthing judges in
public. "Only since the advent of Internet and blogs did things get
widely disseminated that at one time would be discussed at a
cocktail party," Richard said.
"Most lawyers are usually
pretty cautious to avoid that kind of public commentary out of
respect for the system, even if they don't respect the individual
judge."
Conway acknowledged he may
be a test case for the Bar.
Constitutional attorney
Rick Ovelmen, a Miami partner with Jorden Burt, said Conway has some
"strong First Amendment defenses" to the anticipated Bar charges. He
said the rule barring false and reckless statements by attorneys
against judges is based on the defamation rule for public officials
and follows accepted constitutional law against libel of a public
figure.
But Ovelmen said opinion is
protected speech. He said Conway would have defamed Aleman by saying
she was accepting bribes. However, Ovelman thinks Conway has some
good defenses on his "witch" remark.
"I pray to Aleman's God
that the right result will come out. I just wish they would leave me
alone," Conway said. "I wish Judge Aleman would stop reading the
blog and get back to work."
In Conway's case, he used
his name on JAABlog when he complained about Aleman's "new (illegal)
'one week to prepare' policy" setting felony trials one to two weeks
after arraignment. Conway claimed the judge was forcing defendants
to choose between a speedy trial and the right to a fully prepared
defense.
JAABlog is a popular legal
blog run by a small band of Broward criminal defense attorneys. The
blog focuses on claims of judicial abuse and misconduct as well as
courthouse happenings.
In an October post, Conway
wrote that Aleman had an "ugly, condescending attitude" a during
proceeding he sat through." But as anyone who has been in [Aleman's
courtroom] knows, she is clearly unfit for her position and knows
not what it means to be a neutral arbiter," Conway wrote. For the
Web site, he replaced Aleman's name with the words "evil, unfair
witch" when transcribing one of his exchanges with the judge.
The Bar notified Conway in
April that they opened an investigative file against him. The Bar's
17th Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee told Conway this month it
found probable cause against him for violating five Bar rules. One
requires that a lawyer not disparage the qualifications or integrity
of a judge by saying something "the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity." </P?
Another rule he is accused
of violating states a lawyer can not "engage in conduct in
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice." The other counts allege violations of a
rule requiring attorneys to uphold standards of professional
conduct.
The grievance committee
found probable cause against Conway as the state Judicial
Qualifications Commission wrapped up a three-day hearing against
Aleman. She faced charges claiming she behaved in a vindictive
manner, used fear to control her courtroom and exhibited a pattern
of arrogant, impatient and discourteous conduct.
Lansing Scriven, a Tampa,
Fla., attorney prosecuting the JQC case, recommended a public
reprimand for the judge, the lightest form of punishment for a
judge. The commission's six-member hearing panel has not ruled.
Sanctions for judges found
guilty of violating the code of judicial conduct range from a public
reprimand to removal from the bench.
Conway stands by his
actions. He said he was respectful and courteous before Aleman in
court but felt the need to publicly expose her behavior. "Because
our judges are elected, we should not have gag orders over the very
people that work in front of those judges every day," Conway said.
"When something illegal is going on, we expect those people to tell
the public."
Conway said the Bar's
probable cause finding against him indicates people would be better
off posting anonymously instead of signing their name to their
comments."But speaking from hiding is not free speech at all," he
said. "I don't think the founders of our country intended us to use
free speech from secret hiding spots."
Haddad contends the Bar is
overstepping its bounds. He pointed to Aleman's hearing as evidence
that his client's statements weren't unfounded." Conway didn't say
anything that every other lawyer doesn't say in the elevator every
day," Haddad said.
Lawyer
Found Guilty of Unprofessional
Conduct for Calling Judge a Bigot
By Mike McIntyre
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
December 20, 2007
A Winnipeg lawyer has been
found guilty of professional misconduct for calling a judge a bigot
in a letter sent to several colleagues.
The Manitoba Court of
Appeal upheld the ruling in a decision released Tuesday.
Robert Ian Histed claimed
he did nothing wrong and was simply exercising his freedom of
expression under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
He also accused the Law
Society of Manitoba of breaching his privacy rights by allowing the
letter to be used as evidence against him when it was marked
"strictly confidential."
Justice Freda Steel,
writing for the appeal court panel, rejected both arguments.
Steel said the judiciary
should be open to criticism, but to operate effectively, the legal
system must operate with some degree of civility and respect.
Histed was slapped with
$10,000 in fines and surcharges for his actions.
The incident dates back to
2004 when Histed was retained by several clients in residential
school litigation against several parties, including the federal
government.
Histed and opposing lawyers
exchanged several letters as they attempted to agree on a Queen's
Bench justice who could be oversee the case as it wound its way
through the courts. Four specific judges were named as potential
candidates.
Histed referred to one of
the choices as a "bigot" and two others as "too right wing." He
called the fourth choice "fair, intelligent and a really nice guy
(who) would not move the matter forward on a timely basis."
Histed has refused to back
down, claiming he was "simply stating the truth" with his comments.
Questioning Judge's Integrity Gets Local Lawyer Reprimanded
By Douglas S. Malan
The Connecticut Law Tribune
New York Lawyer
October 15, 2007
Hartford attorney Myles
H. Alderman Jr. never admitted to violating any lawyer ethics
rules by implying a judge was biased. But he also didn’t deny that
his statements about the judge might lead to more serious
professional discipline if he didn’t settle the matter with
grievance officials.
Alderman has agreed to a
reprimand based on comments he made during a July 22, 2002,
deposition in his firm's lawsuit against a client to collect unpaid
legal fees. In Alderman & Alderman v. Millbrook Owners'
Association Inc., Alderman made statements about Superior Court
Judge Julia L. Aurigemma during his deposition.
Aurigemma presided over a
lawsuit involving United Technologies Corp. (UTC) that Alderman
brought on behalf of Millbrook Owners' Association, which oversees a
79-unit condominium development in East Windsor. The association
sued Hamilton Standard, a UTC subsidiary, for allegedly causing soil
pollution at the condominium site. Aurigemma ultimately dismissed
the case due to Alderman's delays in complying with court orders.
"My recollection is that a
review of cases [Aurigemma] had decided, had indicated that more
often than not UTC got a good outcome in front of her," Alderman
said during the 2002 deposition. "Whether or not that was justified
or not, I don't know."
Later, according to a
transcript of the deposition, Alderman added, "I had an observation
in the court, that it appeared to me that there was a presumption of
credibility for UTC and UTC's counsel; and that I thought that the
decision that was made by her [to dismiss the condo association's
lawsuit] was in error."
Alderman had consulted with
his counsel, Douglas Evans, before making that statement, which
followed a question asking him if he believed Aurigemma's decision
was based on a bias toward UTC. Evans did not object to the
question. "In retrospect, I wish an objection had been interposed so
I wouldn't have had to answer it," Alderman told the Law Tribune
last week. "As a witness during a deposition, you can only answer
with the honest answer."
"That is protected speech,"
opined Pepe & Hazard's Dan Klau, a neutral party observer. "To hold
otherwise would be to punish a lawyer for a thought crime."
When asked during the
deposition if he shared his opinion with any other parties, Alderman
said, "I may have advised a representative of the [Millbrook] board
that UTC had done well in prior matters before the court, which I
think goes back to presumption of credibility."
He maintained last week
that it is a lawyer's duty to research the past rulings of presiding
judges, and that lawyers often discuss those rulings with their
clients. He added that he never shared his comments in a public
forum.
Alderman accepted grievance
officials' recommendation of a reprimand. "[A] trier of fact could
find by clear and convincing evidence that I violated one or more of
the [state's lawyer-ethics] rules," which might lead to a different
disposition that "could include a greater penalty…," he acknowledged
in the affidavit accompanying his conditional admission and
agreement to discipline.
Alderman told the Law
Tribune it was easier to accept the reprimand than to examine
"40 boxes of evidence" that would've come into play and dragged out
the process, mainly because his wife and law partner, as well as
their son, were going through difficult health issues. "If you'd
asked me the day after the deposition if I'd said anything that
offended anyone, it wasn't that," Alderman said last week. "I
believe that I conducted myself in complete compliance to the letter
and intent of the rules."
Rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct states that lawyers "shall not make a statement
that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to
its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge … ."
Hartford Superior Court
Judge Grant Miller found probable cause of a Rule 8.2(a) violation
when ruling last year against a legal malpractice claim Alderman &
Alderman brought against Evans, the lawyer it retained to represent
it in the fee collection suit against Millbrook Owners' Association.
In other recent grievance
cases:
• A mishandled bankruptcy
filing earned Alvin E. Taylor, an attorney with McNeill &
Associates of Bloomfield, a six-month suspension on Sept. 11
from Hartford Superior Court Judge James T. Graham. Taylor filed a
notice of retirement with grievance officials last November.
Taylor was retained in July
2005 to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition for Alex M. Perry, but
Taylor did not file it until October and did not adequately explain
to Perry the status of the filing, according to grievance officials.
Taylor also failed to file the proper state personal exemption,
which was $75,000, and failed to record both the bankruptcy
resolution, which occurred in December 2005, and the removal of
certain liens on Perry’s personal residence.
Taylor agreed to reimburse
Perry more than $56,000 for his mistake with the exemption but had
not done so as of the time of the grievance hearing. Taylor neither
answered the grievance nor attended a hearing in the matter.
• Instances of bank account
overdrafts and disappearing settlement money led to presentment
orders against West Haven attorney Carolyn Smith Stewart in
late June and she has since gone on inactive status due to medical
conditions.
Statewide Bar Counsel
Michael P. Bowler filed two complaints against Stewart last fall
after she twice wrote checks for $224.95 against her Interest On
Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) funds when the balance was less than
$60. Stewart failed to provide a written explanation of her
activities following Bowler’s two separate requests for
documentation pursuant to Practice Book Section 2-28. She also
failed to file an answer to the grievance complaint.
In a separate grievance
decision, Stewart was ordered presented to the Superior Court for
not paying $1,000 in restitution to the victim of her client. In
October 2004, Stewart told the court, in State v. Lewis, that her
client, Ryan Lewis, had the money to cover the court’s decision.
Based on her statements, the court vacated Lewis’s guilty plea to
having no insurance. The victim’s attorney, Thomas F. Maxwell Jr.,
repeatedly sent letters to Stewart asking about the payment, which
was never made. Stewart never responded to Maxwell’s letters, nor
did she file an answer to the grievance complaint.
Famous
Lawyer, Sanctioned for Likening Judges to Nazis and Jackasses Wins
Appeal, But He's Not Out of the Woodshed Yet
By The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
September 5, 2007
DETROIT - A federal judge has sided with former assisted suicide
lawyer Geoffrey Fieger on rules that sanctioned him for comparing
state appeals court judges to Adolf Hitler and referring to them as
jackasses.
U.S. District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow called the rules
unconstitutional because they are "overly broad and vague" in his
decision released late Tuesday, The Detroit News reported.
Tarnow's ruling "strengthens our democracy and allows us to speak
out against the oppressive forces of corrupt state officials,"
Fieger said Wednesday in a statement.
Fieger had sued the Michigan Supreme Court over its Rules of
Professional Conduct for attorneys after those standards were
imposed on him for the comments he made in a 1999 radio interview.
Those rules say lawyers must treat everyone involved in the legal
process with "courtesy and respect" and should "not engage in
undignified or discourteous conduct" toward the bench.
The suburban Detroit lawyer had argued for his First Amendment
right to use radio appearances to criticize the appellate judges who
overturned a $15 million medical malpractice judgment he had won.
Shortly after the 1999 decision to overturn the judgment, Fieger
called them "three jackass Court of Appeals judges" on his radio
show. He also likened them to Hitler and other Nazis and in a
separate tirade, declared "war" on the judges and made crude remarks
about them.
A message seeking comment on the ruling was left Wednesday
morning with the Michigan Attorney General's office.
Fieger
currently faces federal charges of conspiracy, making illegal
campaign contributions and causing false statements. An indictment,
unsealed Aug. 24, states those charges involved about $127,000 in
illegal campaign contributions made to Democrat John Edwards' 2004
presidential campaign.
Fieger has pleaded not guilty to those charges.
Fieger, who defended assisted-suicide advocate Jack Kevorkian,
was the 1998 Democratic gubernatorial nominee.
Analysis:
A Bit Of Thin Skin Peeks Out Of The Robes
By Adam Liptak
New York Times
April 7, 2007
When judges talk about
threats to judicial independence, which is constantly, they
sometimes make important points about the value of the rule of law
in a democracy. Other times they are looking for a pay raise.
But lately, more and more,
they seem to be saying their work should be above criticism. They
have been lashing out at lawyers and even other judges who say harsh
things about their decisions.
Boyd K. Dyer, for instance,
got a little carried away in appealing decisions to the Utah Supreme
Court. Mr. Dyer, a Utah lawyer, was upset that a state appeals court
there had made what all concerned agree were errors of fact and law
in ruling against his clients in two real estate disputes.
In his appeal, Mr. Dyer
wrote that he believed the mistakes were intentional, saying, for
instance, that the appeals court had ''simply fabricated'' evidence.
In a particularly ripe comment during oral arguments, he compared
the mistakes to ''a recent news development with respect to a little
town in Iraq called Haditha,'' where marines killed 24 unarmed
Iraqis.
The Supreme Court did not
like Mr. Dyer's style, finding his accusations to be ''disrespectful
of the judiciary,'' ''scandalous'' and ''offensive to propriety.''
It dismissed the appeal in January without deciding the case,
effectively ruling against Mr. Dyer's clients, and it ordered him to
pay his adversaries' legal fees, which were about $17,000.
An appeals court in
Sacramento also got prickly when it learned about what it considered
an insulting comment from a state trial judge. ''You can't offend
the kangaroos up there in the kangaroo court,'' the judge, K. Peter
Saiers, had said in a plea hearing.
The three judges on the
appeals court panel gave sober and extended consideration to how
offended they should be. ''This was a pejorative remark,'' they
ruled in December, after consulting a dictionary that defined
''kangaroo court'' as one in which ''the principles of law or
justice are disregarded or perverted.''
Judge Saiers, the appellate
judges said, had violated a canon of the code of judicial ethics,
which requires judges to ''uphold the integrity and independence of
the judiciary.''
Then, in a lovely moment in
February, the appeals court had to reverse course. It turned out
that Judge Saiers's remark about ''the kangaroos up there'' referred
to a committee in the district attorney's office that met upstairs
from his courtroom.
The district attorney,
James P. Willett, had a more mature attitude about the comment. ''He
has a knack for spotting the strengths and weaknesses of a case and
discussing those factors, in plain talk, with the parties,'' Mr.
Willett said of the judge in a letter to the appeals court. ''It is
typically said with a pointed but jocular tone and certainly does
not offend me.''
The Utah and California
cases are only the latest in a series of judicial overreactions. A
particular peeve in other courts is the accusation of intellectual
dishonesty.
In 2005, Michael G.
Brautigam, an Ohio lawyer, said a decision he was appealing to the
Kentucky Supreme Court contained ''extreme intellectual
dishonesty.'' For that, Mr. Brautigam was charged with violating a
Kentucky ethics rule prohibiting false statements about ''the
qualifications or integrity of a judge.''
He said fighting the charge
was burdensome and frustrating. ''Whomever made the formal bar
complaint against me — likely a Kentucky appellate judge — is
protected from being identified by the bar complaint process,'' he
said.
The complaint was
eventually dismissed, and Mr. Brautigam is unrepentant. ''The 2-1
decision of the Court of Appeals was intellectually dishonest,'' he
said. ''I said it. I meant it. I stand behind it.''
Michael A. Wilkins, an
Indiana lawyer, had less luck. He was formally reprimanded a few
years ago by the Indiana Supreme Court for saying in a footnote that
an appeals court decision was so riddled with errors that ''one is
left to wonder whether'' the court ''said whatever was necessary''
to reach the desired result.
A dissenting justice was
left scratching his head. ''It seems to me no different from the
attacks many lawyers and nonprofessionals have launched on many
court decisions, including such notable ones as Bush v. Gore and
Brown v. Board of Education,'' the justice, Theodore R. Boehm,
wrote.
Mr. Dyer, who teaches law
at the University of Utah, did not respond to requests for comment
about his run-in with the State Supreme Court. But his adversary in
the case, Edwin C. Barnes, said Mr. Dyer had promptly apologized and
sent along a personal check for the full amount of Mr. Barnes's
fees.
Mr. Barnes said his
opponent had crossed a line. ''Lawyers suggest error all of the time
— every time we object, every time we appeal,'' he said. ''But it
can be done professionally, without assigning motives or impugning
character.''
That is correct — as a
statement of how to conduct effective advocacy. But, as Justice Hugo
Black wrote in a 1941 decision reversing contempt citations against
a newspaper and a labor leader, courts should be wary of policing
speech critical of them.
''An enforced silence,
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the
bench,'' Justice Black wrote, ''would probably engender resentment,
suspicion and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.''
Fieger
Wins Right to Fight Judges
Appeals Court: Southfield Attorney Can Challenge State High Court
Justices' Refusal to Recuse Themselves
Paul Egan
The Detroit News
December 27, 2006
A
federal appeals court Tuesday upheld lawyer Geoffrey Fieger's right
to challenge the way the Michigan Supreme Court handles requests for
judges to recuse themselves.
The decision of the 6th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is a partial victory for Fieger and a
setback for a Michigan Supreme Court that is battling internal
dissension.
Fieger, the Southfield
attorney known for his inflammatory comments and multimillion-dollar
judgments, state's seven Supreme Court justices to recuse
themselves from his cases.
Fieger alleged Justices
Maura Corrigan, Clifford Taylor, Robert Young Jr. and Stephen
Markman demonstrated personal dislike and bias toward him.
The 6th Circuit upheld a
lower court ruling that federal courts have no jurisdiction to
overturn past refusals by the justices to recuse themselves. But the
appeals court reversed the decision of U.S. District Judge Marianne
O. Battani when it said federal courts may consider a challenge to
the constitutionality of the recusal process.
"This is basically the end
for them," Fieger said of the four justices. "They've basically
considered themselves above the law and they're not answerable to
anybody."
Michigan Supreme Court
justices make their own decisions on whether to recuse themselves
from cases and provide no review process. Fieger alleged that
violates his due process rights.
Battani will proceed with
discovery and a possible trial in federal court in Detroit on
whether the recusal process is constitutional.
Michigan Supreme Court
Justice Elizabeth Weaver, who has criticized her four colleagues for
refusing to disqualify themselves from Fieger's cases, last week
criticized them again in a dissenting opinion, saying they were
advancing a policy of greater secrecy and less accountability.
Those justices have alleged
Weaver is resentful over being replaced as chief justice.
Rusty Hills, a spokesman
for the Michigan Attorney General's Office that argued the appeal
for the Supreme Court, declined comment.
To read the petition for
writ of certiorari in Fieger v. Michigan Grievance
Administrator -- a case asking whether an attorney has a First
Amendment right to publicly express non-defamatory personal
criticism of a judge click here.
Top State
Court Denies Fieger Request to Postpone Reprimand
Majority of Justices
Say the Action Will Not Harm
His Ability to Practice Law as He Makes an Appeal
David Eggert
Associated Press
December 22, 2006
Lansing-- The Michigan
Supreme Court on Thursday denied lawyer Geoffrey Fieger's request to
postpone disciplinary action against him for vulgar comments about
judges, and the case again exposed the long-standing animosity among
Republican justices.
The majority said Fieger
would suffer no "irreparable injury" if his reprimand stays in place
while he appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The court in July had
reprimanded Fieger, which doesn't affect his ability to practice
law.
In her dissent Thursday,
Justice Elizabeth Weaver accused four other GOP justices of imposing
secrecy around the court's operations when they issued a Dec. 6
order to keep confidential justices' internal communications
involving cases.
Weaver wrote that the order
was a "gag order" showing the "majority of four's increasing
advancement of a policy of greater secrecy and less accountability."
She accused them of using
the order to suppress her dissent before changing their minds
Thursday and allowing it to be published.
Chief Justice Clifford
Taylor and Justices Maura Corrigan, Stephen Markman and Robert Young
Jr. responded that Weaver improperly disclosed internal memorandums
and deliberations in her "unprecedented" dissent.
Taylor wrote that he
couldn't directly respond to Weaver's "selective and misleading
disclosures" because of an obligation to honor confidentiality.
Taylor said the court will
hold a hearing Jan. 17 on whether to retain the order keeping
certain communications confidential.
He also said justices will
consider what means of enforcement or sanction should be in place
when a justices violates the rule.
Justices traditionally have
not talked publicly about what is said during case deliberations.
Democratic Justice Michael
Cavanagh said he didn't think Weaver's dissent violated the law.
The dispute partly stems
from the high court's decision to reprimand Fieger for vulgar
remarks he made on the radio about three state Court of Appeals
judges.
At the time of the ruling,
Weaver said Taylor, Corrigan, Markman and Young showed bias and
prejudice against Fieger by not disqualifying themselves from the
case.
The majority responded in
the Fieger ruling that Weaver's criticism was "rooted in personal
resentment."
In 2001, Weaver wanted to
keep her job as chief justice, but Corrigan was chosen instead.
To Read Opinion on Fieger discipline a lengthy discussion on the
First Amendment right of lawyers go to:
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/Opinions-05-06-Term/127547.pdf
Letter to
the Editor:
the Absolute Duty of Judges Is to Follow, Uphold the Law
Henry M. Coxe, III
President, The Florida Bar
Tallahassee
The Stuart News
December 22, 2006
Regarding the editorial ("Is this any way to honor judges?" Nov.
28), and the guest column by Barry L. Crane ("News flash: Florida's
judges play politics," Dec. 1), to paraphrase Voltaire, I may
disagree with what you say, but will defend to the end your right to
say it.
The Florida Bar respects
the editorial's encouragement of greater education of the electorate
in voting on judicial merit retention. We conduct a statewide poll
of lawyers — who are most familiar with the qualifications of
Florida's judges — prior to each retention election as a public
service to voters.
But we continue to look for
additional ways to evaluate judges in both their selection and
retention, with the goal of having the highest quality judicial
officers possible.
However, the Bar has no
such respect for the guest columnist's attack on four respected
judges of the 4th District Court of Appeal that suggests their
decisions have been based on anything but the evidence and the law.
To suggest that any of
these judges consistently take one side in a criminal case is
nothing more than a skewed view of the writer. The opinions of each
of these judges are a matter of public record and are based on the
spirit of a fair and impartial judiciary devoid of political and
special interest concerns.
Simply put, judges are
bound to apply the laws as they now exist. Judges do not write laws;
they must abide by them as they are written, even if they personally
disagree with them. The bottom line is this: a judge's absolute duty
is to follow the law and uphold it, and there are checks and
balances in place to ensure judicial ethics are maintained.
China
Suspends 3-Year Sentence
for Lawyer Who Posted Dissent Online
By Scott McDonald
Associated Press Writer
New York Lawyer
December 22, 2006
BEIJING -- A Chinese activist lawyer was convicted of subversion for
posting political essays on foreign Web sites and received a
suspended three-year prison sentence, a state news agency reported
Friday.
Gao Zhisheng was
detained in August amid a crackdown on Chinese lawyers who represent
clients with grievances against the government regarding corruption,
land seizures and other complaints.
Gao was convicted based on
nine articles posted on Web sites abroad, the Xinhua News Agency
reported, disclosing the details of the charges against him for the
first time. It said the articles "defamed and made rumors about
China's current government and social system, conspiring to topple
down the regime."
Xinhua did not say when the
verdict was handed down. Phone calls to the Beijing No. 1
Intermediate People's Court, where Gao's trial took place, were not
answered.
Gao will be under
supervision for five years, and if he breaks the law during that
period the three-year sentence will be reinstated, Xinhua reported.
He also was stripped of political rights for one year. Under Chinese
law, such rights include free speech and the ability to gather or
protest.
Xinhua said Gao's sentence
was lenient because he "voluntarily reported others' offenses and
provided important clues for cracking other cases."
Gao's one-day trial took
place two weeks ago, but his lawyer Mo Shaoping was barred from
attending on the grounds that it involved official secrets.
"I have still not received
the verdict from the court," Mo said. "I shouldn't comment before
seeing the verdict, but for the sentence I can say it is not heavy
and within my expectations. If the sentence is suspended, he could
be released on bail very soon."
Xinhua said articles cited
at Gao's trial had titles such as "Three Open Letters to Hu Jintao
and Wen Jiabao," referring to China's president and premier, and
"The Regime Has Never Stopped Killing People."
It said they appeared on
Web sites such as the Falun Gong-affliated Epochtimes.com.
Gao also gave interviews to
foreign media "and the records of his seditious talks were made into
audio programs and posted on their Web sites for online listening
and downloading," Xinhua said.
The Chinese government has
been tightening restrictions on lawyers this year in an apparent
effort to contain a surge in politically sensitive cases. The new
restrictions require lawyers to follow government guidance in
handling cases, to avoid talking to foreign reporters and to
discourage clients from protesting.
A group of more than 50
foreign scholars and human rights campaigners issued a public appeal
in October for Beijing to stop harassing activists, citing the cases
of Gao and others.
Lawyer
Disciplined for Comparing Judges to Nazis
By David Eggert
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
August 2, 2006
The Michigan Supreme Court
on Monday reprimanded an outspoken lawyer for "vulgar and crude"
attacks against appeals court judges, whom he likened during radio
appearances to Nazis.
The court voted 4-3 to
reprimand Geoffrey Fieger for twice appearing on Detroit-areas radio
shows in 1999 and calling state Court of Appeals judges "jackasses"
and other names. The judges had angered Fieger by overturning a $15
million medical malpractice judgment he had won.
Fieger -- best known for
defending assisted-suicide advocate Jack Kevorkian -- also likened
the judges to Adolph Hitler and other Nazis.
Fieger argued he and other
lawyers have a First Amendment right to publicly criticize judges.
The Michigan Attorney Discipline Board agreed in a 2004 ruling, but
the grievance board that filed the complaint against Fieger appealed
to the state's high court.
In the majority opinion,
Chief Justice Clifford Taylor concluded Fieger's broadcast remarks
were "nothing more than personal abuse."
The dissent said Fieger's
speech was political and should be protected under the U.S.
Constitution.
The reprimand does not
affect Fieger's license to practice law. His attorney promised an
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Supreme
Court Places Attorney on Probation
By Robert Napper
Highlands Today
Mar 21, 2006
SEBRING, Fla. - A Sebring attorney has been reprimanded and
placed on probation by the Florida Supreme Court for swearing at
prosecutors and writing a scathing letter to a local judge on an
open case, according to court documents.
The Florida Supreme Court
formally reprimanded longtime Sebring defense attorney Steve Kackley
and placed him on two years probation with the Florida Bar.
Kackley is still allowed to
practice law in the state of Florida, but has been ordered to
complete the conditions of his probation, according to Kenneth Bryk,
who investigated Kackley for the Florida Bar.
The Florida Supreme Court
ruled Kackley must contact Florida Lawyers Assistance Inc. for an
evaluation. Florida Lawyers Assistance provides "assistance to bar
members who suffer from substance abuse, mental health, or other
disorders which negatively affect their lives and careers,"
according to its Web site.
If treatment is recommended
as a result of the evaluation, the court ordered Kackley to enter
into a rehabilitation contract with Florida Lawyers Assistance.
The Supreme Court also
ordered Kackley pay a registration fee of $250 and probation
monitoring fee of $100 a month to the Florida Bar. Kackley was also
ordered to pay the Florida Bar $2,805.48 for investigative costs.
The Florida Bar’s
investigation documents a letter Kackley wrote to then Highlands
County Judge Peter Estrada on Dec. 12, 2003, expressing outrage over
a ruling Estrada made against his client, putting her jail. Estrada
has since been appointed as circuit judge in Highlands County.
At the time of the letter,
the case was still pending in front of Estrada, which violated
Florida Bar rules, according to court documents.
"Judges like yourself still
think like prosecutors, the easiest answer is to put them in jail
rather than take the time and give each and every case the attention
it deserves," Kackley’s letter to Estrada said, according Bryk’s
report.
"You are more concerned
with pleasing the probation officer than doing your job as an
impartial judge," the letter said.
Kackley wrote to Estrada
that his ruling "was not only a miscarriage of justice, it was
downright immoral."
The reprimand and probation
also stemmed from two incidents in 2003 when Florida Bar officials
say Kackley yelled and swore at state prosecutors and a probation
officer with regard to cases he worked on.
Kackley expressed
frustration over the ruling, pointing out to the Florida Bar
numerous cases in which attorneys did much worse without punishment.
He said completing probation will not be a problem.
"They do what they have to
do. I felt like my client was being mistreated and lost my temper.
Sometimes it goes with the territory if you are a good defense
attorney. I am sorry it happened," he said.
Kackley said he sent the
letter to Estrada as a concerned citizen and made a mistake by
referencing a pending case.
"I was not trying to
influence him on the case. I just wanted to set up a meeting to
discuss some concerns I had with the judicial system in Highlands
County. I know all of the judges in Highlands County, have practiced
in front of all of them, and have the highest respect for them,"
said Kackley.
This story can be
found at:
http://www.highlandstoday.com/MGB503BG1LE.html
Lawyer's
Insults of Judges Escalate Into Speech Case
By Tresa Baldas
The National Law Journal
March 20, 2006
A constitutional battle
involving a lawyer's right to insult a judge has been joined at the
Michigan Supreme Court, which could set new limits on what lawyers
say and do outside the courtroom.
And at the center of it all
is Geoffrey Fieger, the outspoken former attorney for
assisted-suicide doctor Jack Kevorkian.
Fieger faces a reprimand
from the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission for insulting three
state appellate judges on a radio talk show in 1999 after the judges
overturned a $15 million verdict he won in a medical malpractice
case.
According to the grievance
commission, Fieger used numerous obscenities, called the justices
"three jackass court of appeals judges," declared war on them and
referred to them as "Nazis."
Big deal, argued Fieger's
lawyer, Michael Alan Schwartz, maintaining that Fieger's comments
outside the courtroom are protected by the First Amendment.
"There's no law that says
you've got to be dignified," said Schwartz of Schwartz, Kelly &
Oltarz-Schwartz in Farmington Hills, Mich. "Why are they looking to
Fieger and what did he do that was so terrible? He made some
uncharitable comments about a couple of judges in the course of a
radio program."
MICHIGAN'S UNIQUE RULES
But according to the
grievance commission, Fieger violated two Michigan rules regarding
professional conduct, including a "courtesy rule," which is unique
to Michigan and requires that lawyers treat judges with respect and
courtesy.
"We all agree that
attorneys have the right to criticize judges. There's no doubt about
that ... . They just have to do so in a professional way," said
Robert Edick, deputy administrator for the grievance commission.
Edick said the commission
is asking the state high court to draw the line between an
attorney's right to free speech and an attorney's obligation to
courtesy and professionalism.
"This is more of a very
pure courtesy case," said Edick, adding that the commission also
wants clarity on whether it can "prosecute lawyers for repeated
public acts of discourtesy."
In 2004, the state Attorney
Discipline Board ruled that Fieger's comments were protected by the
Constitution. But the grievance commission believes Fieger went too
far with his antics and has appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court,
which heard arguments from both sides last week.
Attorney George Kuhlman,
ethics counsel with the American Bar Association, said there is no
ABA rule that specifically says that a lawyer's statements cannot be
disrespectful of the court. He noted that there is an ABA rule that
prohibits lawyers from using reckless disregard or making a false
statement about a judge's integrity.
Kuhlman also noted that
disciplinary boards can call into question the private conduct of
lawyers, particularly if it reflects on their fitness to practice
law.
"Of course you can go after
somebody for saying something about somebody outside a courtroom,"
Kuhlman said. "It doesn't matter where it occurred. It could be on
an island [in] the south Pacific. If it reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law ... it could be a violation of the rules of
professional conduct."
In the Fieger case, Kuhlman
said that it will be up to the court to decide whether Fieger's
comments were protected by the First Amendment. He said case law on
such matters tends to go in the direction of the First Amendment.
Kuhlman cited a 1995 ruling
from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which cleared an
attorney, who had called a judge anti-Semitic, of any wrongdoing.
The 9th Circuit held that the accusation of anti-Semitism was
protected because the lawyer gave a factual basis for his opinion.
Standing C Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430.
Meanwhile, Schwartz said he
too has plenty of case law to back up Fieger's First Amendment
claims.
He cited the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1947 Craig v. Harney decision, in which the high court ruled
in favor of a group of individuals who were held in contempt for
publishing derogatory articles about a judge.
Schwartz said that if the
Michigan Supreme Court rules against Fieger in this case, that would
have "a chilling effect on an attorney's ability to engage in
criticism of government officials.
"That's what we're talking
about here. Judges are government officials, and once we allow
people to be harmed for criticizing government officials, we've lost
an enormous bunch of freedoms," Schwartz said. "That's pretty,
pretty, pretty bad."
Lawyer's
Criticism of Judge on "Secure"
Internet Site Lands Him in Ethical Thicket
By Dan Lynch
New York Lawyer
Miami Daily Business Review
November 9, 2005
Brian F. Labovick was
shocked to receive a letter from Palm Beach Circuit Judge Diana
Lewis, saying that she’d received a copy of a critical note about
her that the Jupiter attorney had posted on a confidential Internet
forum.
In the letter, Lewis who
was presiding over an auto negligence case Labovick was handling
indicated that she had received a copy of Labovick’s Web posting
from an anonymous source. She included the posting with her letter,
but offered no comment on it.
In the posting to the
200-member discussion group run by the Palm Beach County Trial
Lawyers Association, Labovick criticized a modified voir dire
procedure the judge had used.
Now the posting, and Judge
Lewis’ response, have triggered an unusual ethics controversy. The
Palm Beach County Trial Lawyers Association has hired a forensic
expert to investigate who may have breached the Web discussion
group’s confidentiality rules. The association’s board is
considering lodging a complaint against the perpetrator with Chief
Palm Beach Circuit Judge Kathleen Kroll.
The association also is
considering seeking Florida Bar sanctions against the perpetrator.
The association declined to say on what formal grounds it might
bring its complaint. All members of the discussion group, called
Trial Talk, had signed an oath promising not to disclose anything
from the Web site to nonmembers.
""If a lawyer did it and
lied about it, he could be subject to discipline," said site founder
Walter C. Jones IV, a Palm Beach Gardens lawyer. "He wouldn’t be
disbarred or anything, but the candor of the site is compromised
when its security is violated.""
The underlying auto
negligence case, Guertin-Sykes v. Jinn, was tried in
September. It concluded with a jury verdict for the defense. The
defense has filed a post-trial motion for attorney fees and costs.
Judge Lewis declined to
comment on any aspect of the controversy on the grounds that the
auto negligence case is pending. The Daily Business Review could not
obtain either Lewis’ letter or Labovick’s Web posting.
In an interview, Labovick
declined to go into any detail about his Web criticism of Judge
Lewis or her new voir dire procedure, saying his comments were
confidential. Since receiving her letter, he said, he has had no
discussion with the judge about the posting.
"I don’t know how the judge
gained access to it," Labovick said. "She sent me a very factual
note that said to one effect or another that she had seen it. I
would not speculate on her motives in sending me that note."
Labovick said Judge Lewis
also sent the letter and enclosure to the other lawyer in the case.
"So it might be that she was simply adhering to judicial ethics that
forbid her from ex parte communication with anybody in a case before
her," he said.
Neither of the two defense
lawyers in the case James Munsey of North Palm Beach and Cymonie S.
Rowe of Boca Raton returned a call for comment.
Coral Gables attorney David
Deehl, of Deehl & Carlson, who served for a decade on The Florida
Bar’s professional ethics committee, said Judge Lewis "probably"
behaved appropriately in notifying both sides in the case that she
had received a communication from a third party regarding Labovick.
But Deehl, who’s not
involved in the case, said that without knowing the precise content
of Labovick’’s Web posting and Lewis’ letter he couldn’t say whether
any Bar ethics rule was violated.
Anthony Alfieri, director
of the University of Miami law school’s Center for Ethics and Public
Service, said there are at least four levels of ethics issues that
need to be explored in the case Labovick’s original Web posting, the
disclosure of the posting, whether opposing counsel participated in
the disclosure, and whether Judge Lewis’ letter to the lawyers
violated judicial canon.
Another ethics question is
whether Labovick told his client in the auto negligence case about
the incident with Judge Lewis and the potential for it to impact the
case. One lawyer who did not want to be identified said Labovick is
obligated to consult with the client. Labovick did not return a
second phone call to discuss this issue.
Critical of Lewis’
treatment
According to one attorney
who did not want to be identified, the issue raised by Labovick in
his Web posting centered on how Judge Lewis chose to interview
prospective jurors.
Normally, the members of
the jury pool are interviewed in one large group, and if a juror
makes a comment that could taint the rest of the pool, the judge
will call that individual up for private questioning by the
plaintiff and defense sides.
But given the courts’
budget and time constraints, judges face growing pressure to avoid
having an entire jury pool tainted by an individual’s comments and
then being forced to call another large bloc of potential jurors for
voir dire.
To avoid that situation,
Judge Lewis reportedly asked potential jurors to come up
individually for questioning on hot-button issues such as their
feelings about insurance companies, then she had them return to the
general pool for other types of questions. That apparently is what
Labovick complained about.
Judge Lewis, 52, a former
shareholder at Carlton Fields who was elected to the bench in 2002,
attended Notre Dame University law school with a number of current
members of the trial lawyers’ discussion group.
West Palm Beach attorney
David Prather said that he has high regard for Judge Lewis but said
his view is not universally held in the Palm Beach County Trial
Lawyers Association, of which he is a member.
Some members who have
appeared before Lewis, he said, have been critical of their
"perceived treatment" in her courtroom. He declined to elaborate.
In the Palm Beach County
Bar Association’’s 2005 survey of its members’’ views of local
judges, 29.5 percent of respondents rated Lewis’ demeanor and
courtesy to lawyers excellent, while 36.5 percent said she needs
improvement. Only three other judges received higher "needs
improvement"" scores on demeanor.
On knowledge of the law,
Lewis was rated excellent by 46.8 percent, and on impartiality was
rated excellent by 46.2 percent.
Site not hackable
The Trial Talk Web site
started by the Palm Beach County Trial Lawyers Association on Yahoo!
about five years ago is supposed to be secure and access limited to
members of association members, Jones said.
Members can get access only
through use of a private password, and they’re sworn to secrecy
about its contents, said Prather, a plaintiff lawyer and associate
at Lytal Reiter Clark Fountain & Williams.
The Web site is similar to
professional discussion sites operated by trial lawyer groups in
Florida and around the country, and similar to sites operated by
professionals in other industries, Jones said.
The site’s purpose, Prather
said, is to provide members with information and insights that can
help them serve clients. Only lawyers who solely represent
plaintiffs are permitted to use the site.
"It’s not a forum designed
for people to criticize judges, although you might see some
constructive criticism on it occasionally," Prather said.
Its purpose, he said, is to
"promote the free flow of productive information information on
orders, on the tendencies of certain judges in certain sorts of
rulings, on how various judges handle jury selection. It provides
information on expert witnesses. People can ask other members if any
of them have depositions from this expert or that one."
"It’s a secure site," Jones
said. "The FBI could get in, I suppose. But the average person
couldn’t hack that site."
"I do think the integrity
of the site has been impaired," Prather said.
A letter describing the
incident has gone out to all members of the discussion group.
Prather said he considers the breach of confidentiality to be an
ethical violation by the perpetrator.
"We’re concerned now that
if we say things [on the Web site], it’s going to be leaked to
everyone, including the news media," Jones said. "It definitely puts
a chill on it."
Labovick said his posting
did not represent "a personality issue" between himself and Judge
Lewis. It was "a warning to other members that this is the way Judge
Lewis is now doing this in her courtroom. That’s all it was."
Law editor Harris Meyer
provided additional reporting for this article.
Associate
Can't Be Fired for Following Ethics Rules
By Thomas B. Scheffey
New York Lawyer
The Connecticut Law Tribune
August 15, 2005
In Connecticut’s first
case on the subject, a judge has ruled that a lawyer should not be
fired for trying to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct,
because doing so constitutes an "important public policy" exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine.
New Haven Superior Court
Judge Carmen Lopez rejected the arguments of Guilford-based Delaney,
Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, which fired associate Bruce
Matzkin after he sought to grieve another lawyer for suspected
witness tampering.
"Because the legal
profession is self-regulated and relies upon its members to police
itself, no lawyer’s employment should be conditioned upon turning a
blind eye to violations of the Rules which are applicable to all
lawyers," Lopez wrote.
Matzkin claimed a firm
partner told him "we do not grieve other lawyers," when he attempted
to get permission to report to bar authorities that a trial opponent
called witnesses Matzkin had subpoenaed, telling them they need not
come to court.
Matzkin says he considered
it witness tampering, and believed he had a duty under Rule 8.3(a),
which requires reporting any violation of the ethics rules "that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer ..."
Special Responsibility
The firm, represented by
name partner Patrick M. Noonan, argued in its motion to strike that
the ethics rule "does not rise to the level of ‘an important public
policy’’" that would warrant making an exception to employers’
basic right to fire an employee without any grounds.
Noonan noted that no
Connecticut court had ever found the Rules of Professional Conduct
are significant enough to create a public policy exception and
provide grounds for a wrongful termination suit. He noted they do
not give rise to a civil claim for money damages, and contended the
public was only indirectly impacted by Matzkin alleged inability to
report another lawyer’s ethical misconduct.
In her July 29 opinion,
Lopez found otherwise. She quoted the preamble to the Rules, which
says, "A lawyer is a representative of clients, and officer of the
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice."
If a lawyer could be fired
with impunity for following the self-policing requirement of the
professional rules, Lopez concluded, "this would compromise the
autonomy of the profession." The judge rejected the idea that it
mattered whether Matzkin followed through and actually filed a
grievance. In the leading case on "public policy" exceptions to the
at-will rule, Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, there was no
evidence in the record that plaintiff ever reported his employer to
health authorities. But the majority concluded that the important
part of the Sheets case is that the employee confronted his employer
as a whistleblower, and was fired for it.
Our Debate:
Do Lawyers Have Free Speech?
CrainsDetroit.com
August 08, 2005
How much freedom of speech
should lawyers be allowed to comment about judges? That’s an issue
being weighed in a legal battle between prominent plaintiff attorney
Geoffrey Fieger and the state’s attorney-discipline system.
The dispute arose in August
1999 after Fieger made remarks on a radio program he hosted about
three Michigan Appeals Court judges who had reversed a judgment for
a Fieger client.
The Attorney Grievance
Commission filed a case against Fieger in 2001. Last November, the
Attorney Discipline Board set aside a reprimand against Fieger and
dismissed the charge. The commission appealed to the Michigan
Supreme Court earlier this year, and Fieger’’s lawyers removed the
case to U.S. District Court in June. Fieger insists he cannot get a
fair hearing before state judges.
Links to case documents are
in the online version of this report at www.crainsdetroit.com under
"This Week’s Issue" in the gray navigation bar.
U.S. District Judge
Marianne Battani has scheduled a Sept. 14 hearing on whether the
case should be heard in federal or state court. Crain’s
asked two legal scholars to argue both sides of the question:
Yes -
By Robert Sedler,
constitutional-law professor, Wayne State University.
No - By Stephen Safranek, professor, Ave Maria School of Law.
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/cgi-bin/article.pl?articleId=27543
Read the related document from the Attorney
Discipline Board.
Two Bar
Disciplinary Rules Challenged in Federal Court
The Florida Bar News
By Gary Blankenship
June 15, 2005
An Orlando attorney has
asked a federal court to declare unconstitutional two Florida Bar
rules, claiming they violate lawyers’ rights to free speech.
Steven G. Mason, who is represented by fellow Orlando lawyer Jerome
Hennigan, said the action is needed because he faces a Bar grievance
investigation for violating Rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.4(d). He said
those rules violate the First, Fifth, and 14th amendments to the
U.S. Constitution.
The Bar has responded by filing a motion to dismiss Mason’s suit.
The case stems from two different trials in which Mason was involved
earlier this year and comments he made in two different Orlando
Sentinel stories.
In one case, he represented the Democratic Party which was opposing
a call for a special mayoral election in Orlando. After a local
judge ruled the election should proceed, Mason was quoted as saying
he would seek an appeal and "It’s an illegal election . . . . We’ll
find some judges on the appellate court who aren’t afraid of the
political heat and we’re going to win this thing."
The other case involved a jury ruling against his client in a
racketeering case, and Mason was quoted as saying, "Unfortunately,
this jury got absolutely buffaloed. They got snookered, beyond
snookered. . . . I would like to see their faces when they find out
another jury in this courthouse found these people not guilty of
every single charge based on the exact same facts."
Rule 4-8.2(a) prohibits lawyers from making false statements or
statements made with a reckless disregard on whether they are true
or false, about the parties in a cases, including judges and jurors.
Rule 4-8.4 bars conduct by a lawyer that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice "including to knowingly, or through
callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on
any basis . . ."
Rule 4-8.2(a), Mason’s suit says, is "vague and far too broad and
thus overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The rule
prevents comments and criticism concerning any official, judges,
etc. (e.g. a ‘‘public legal officer’’) and directly impinges
upon free speech including unabashed discussions and frank opinions
of lawyers either in a private or public forum. Likewise, Rule
4-8.4(d) impinges upon free speech because it prohibits an attorney
from advocating or offering comments on any subject that can be
characterized as a violation of the terms within the rule. . . .
"Based upon its broad terms, the rule is vague and overbroad and,
hence, violates the First, Fifth and 14th amendments to the United
States Constitution."
Tallahassee attorneys Barry Richard and Laureen E. Galeoto, who
prepared the Bar’s motion to dismiss Mason’s case, noted that no
conclusion had been reached in the disciplinary case and that Mason
did not, in his suit, deny making the statements.
"Mason cannot meet the high threshold required by the U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence to establish vagueness and over breadth, the
motion said. "In fact, as discussed herein, the ample law
interpreting and applying the rules at issue, and comparable rules
from other jurisdictions, have clearly placed Mason on notice of the
proscribed conduct."
The motion argued that the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court, and various courts around the country have held in similar
cases that such language is neither vague nor overbroad and is
easily understood given the traditions of the practice of law. Those
rulings also held that unwarranted derogatory statements about
participants in the legal system are not protected by the First
Amendment.
"Mason . . . can, with the exercise of ordinary common sense,
sufficiently understand and comply with Rules 4-8.4(d) and
4-8.2(a)," the motion said.
Mason filed his case in the U. S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. It is case no. 6:05-CV-627-ORL-28.
Lawyer
Fights Florida Bar Inquiry
By Anthony Colarossi
Orlando Sentinel Fl.
May 12, 2005
In a town where many lawyers find virtue in keeping their names out
of the newspaper, Steven G. Mason doesn't mind so much seeing his
name in print.
The veteran Orlando attorney also isn't afraid of taking on
government, commenting on judicial improprieties or just plain
speaking his mind.
"I've been fighting for the underdog my entire career," Mason says.
"And I'm not going to stop now."
But Mason's penchant for speaking frankly about court decisions he
disagrees with might have finally caught up with him. Soon after he
was quoted in the Orlando Sentinel in early April at the height of
the mayoral-election debacle, The Florida Bar began a grievance
inquiry against him based on his published comments.
And now it appears two 9th Judicial Circuit judges called the Bar
concerning his comments, according to a letter Mason's lawyer wrote
to a Bar attorney.
The inquiry will determine whether Mason violated rules of
professional conduct and made disparaging comments about a judge in
one case and a jury in another.
Mason, who insists that the complaint was handled inappropriately,
has fired back.
He filed a federal lawsuit late last month, arguing that Florida Bar
rules under which he was cited "unconstitutionally inhibit free
speech."
The outcome of the lawsuit could have broader implications on what
Florida lawyers may say publicly and privately about judges, jurors
and one another.
But for Mason, this fight is very much a personal one.
"I have been representing clients for years who have fought with the
government," he said. "And now I feel like the government is coming
after me to muzzle me. And if they can muzzle me, that's the next
best thing to killing me."
On a practical level, a Florida Bar complaint is something any
attorney needs to take seriously.
It could lead to a quiet dismissal of the inquiry, a reprimand, a
suspension or even disbarment.
Mason's problems began soon after he was quoted twice in an April 2
article. In the newspaper piece, Mason said he planned to appeal
Orange Circuit Judge Jay Cohen's decision to allow a special
election for mayor.
At the time, Mayor Buddy Dyer was under indictment, suspended and
facing a criminal charge of paying someone to collect absentee
ballots. Since then, the charges against Dyer and three others have
been dropped.
Mason, recruited by local Democrats, had challenged the legality of
the special election to find Dyer's temporary replacement.
After Cohen's decision, Mason was quoted in the Sentinel as saying,
"We'll find some judges on the appellate court who aren't afraid of
the political heat, and we're going to win this thing."
Mason said he was quoted accurately in the article, but he added
that he meant no disrespect to Cohen.
After receiving the Florida Bar inquiry April 15, Mason said he was
initially unable to confirm who initiated the complaint.
But after Mason filed the federal lawsuit and retained attorney
Jerome Hennigan, the Bar confirmed that Cohen himself and Circuit
Judge Frederick Lauten contacted the Bar by phone about Mason's
comments.
Reached late last week, Cohen confirmed that he made the call to the
Bar.
"I fully support Steve Mason's right to criticize the decision by
the court and to appeal that decision," Cohen said. "However, I
believe that when he goes beyond that and impugns the integrity of
the court, that's inappropriate under the rules of professional
responsibility."
Lauten could not be reached for comment.
Mason faces questions about his actions and speech, and he argues
that they're protected.
His lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment to find The Florida Bar
rules used in his case are unconstitutional.
And it asks for a "permanent injunction" forever blocking the Bar
from enforcing the rules.
Anthony Colarossi can be reached at acolarossi@orlandosentinel.com
or 407-420-6218.
Orlando
Attorney Sues Florida Bar
——
Again
By David L. Hudson Jr.
First Amendment Center
May 10. 2005
A Florida attorney has
filed a lawsuit against the state bar because he says it’s trying
to squelch his free speech.
After an "informal inquiry"
from the Florida Bar regarding statements attributed to him in the
press, Orlando-based attorney Steven G. Mason filed a federal
lawsuit on April 26. He is challenging, on First Amendment grounds,
the constitutionality of two Florida Bar rules.
Mason also seeks a
declaratory judgment that the statements he made to the news media
are protected under the U.S. Constitution.
Mason filed the lawsuit
after receiving an April 14 letter from the state bar, the agency
that regulates attorneys in Florida by authority from the Florida
Supreme Court. The letter, from bar counsel Frances R. Brown-Lewis,
said Mason needed to respond to the bar within 15 days with respect
to whether statements attributed to Mason in The Orlando Sentinel
"are true, complete and correct and whether said statements are
a violation of Rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.4(d)."
Mason responded with his
lawsuit, Mason v. Florida Bar, filed in Orlando.
The first rule Mason
challenged,
Rule
4-8.2(a), reads:
"A lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications
of a judge, mediator, arbitrator, adjudicatory officer, public legal
officer, juror or member of the venire or candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office."
The second,
Rule
4-8.4(d), provides that a lawyer shall not:
"engage in conduct in
connection with the practice of law or in connection with the
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference,
disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis,
including, but not limited to on account of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation, age, socio-economic status, employment, or physical
characteristics."
With respect to Rule
4-8.2(a), Mason contends the law is both vague and overbroad. "The
rules prevent comments and criticisms concerning any public
official, judges, etc. (e.g., a ‘public legal officer’) and directly
impinge upon free speech including unabashed discussions and frank
opinions of lawyers either in a private or public forum," he said in
his lawsuit.
Mason’’s complaint also
attacks Rule 4-8.4(d) on its face, particularly the clause "on any
basis."
"These rules potentially
control and curb a lawyer’s speech across the universe of possible
comments,"" Mason told the First Amendment Center Online. ‘On any
basis’ obviously means on any basis and that, in and of itself,
violates the First Amendment. When I leave the courthouse, I am
absolutely entitled to speak on any subject and offer my opinion
even if it addresses a judge."
Attached to the bar’s April
14 letter to Mason were copies of two newspaper articles that
apparently provoked the inquiry.
In a Feb. 2, 2005, Orlando
Sentinel story, Mason was quoted as saying: "Unfortunately, this
jury got absolutely buffaloed. They got snookered, beyond snookered.
I would like to see their faces when they find out another jury in
this courthouse found these people not guilty of every single charge
based on the exact same facts."
The news story referred to
a civil-forfeiture case brought against a former bingo-hall operator
and two of his corporations. A jury found that Mason’s client had
engaged in racketeering activities and could be subject to the
forfeiture laws.
In an April 2, 2005,
Sentinel story headlined "Special election can proceed, judge says,"
Mason said: "It’s an illegal election. We’ll find some judges on
the appellate court who aren’t afraid of the political heat, and
we’re going to win this thing."
These comments pertained to
a different case, Orange County Democratic Executive Committee v.
City of Orlando, in which Mason represented a local Democratic Party
committee that objected to a special election for Orlando mayor
after Florida Gov. Jeb Bush suspended Democratic Mayor Buddy Dyer.
(The case became moot after election-law charges were dropped
against Dyer and he was reinstated.)
The Florida Bar has not
filed an answer to Mason’s complaint. Mason, however, has filed more
legal papers, including a "motion to disqualify" the Florida Bar
from instigating an inquiry into whether Mason violated its rules.
Mason and his attorney, Jerome Hennigan, allege that the bar
violated its own
Rule
3-7.3(c), which requires that "All
complaints, except those initiated by The Florida Bar, shall be in
writing and under oath."
Mason says he and his
attorney learned from the Florida Bar that the inquiry began after
telephone complaints from two judges. Mason’s "motion to
disqualify" says that "it is clear in this case that the Bar did not
timely disclose to Mr. Mason that this inquiry was in fact initiated
by two local judges in violation of Rule 3-7.3(c) and that this
information only came to light after significant prodding on the
part of Mr. Mason and [Hennigan]."
Mason describes the case so
far as "a soap opera with a very powerful institution."
This is not the first time
that Mason has tangled with the Florida Bar. He sued the bar in 1998
after it prohibited him from running a truthful ad saying he had
received the highest rating from the Martindale-Hubbell legal
directory. In 2000, a three-judge panel of the 11th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in
Mason v.
Florida Bar that the bar violated Mason’s
commercial-speech rights when it refused his ad.
Mason vows he’s prepared to
take his current case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, if need
be: "My entire professional career I have been fighting for the
rights of a lot of people, many of them underdogs to the
establishment. It would be hypocritical of me to bow out and take
the easy way. If necessary, I’ll knock on the door of Justice
Ginsburg."
Related
Lawyer prevails in dispute with
Florida Bar over Yellow Page ad
By David L. Hudson Jr. Orlando attorney Steven Mason
says he feels 'vindicated' by federal appeals panel's ruling.
04.14.00
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15239
Fla. Lawyer Loses Right to Practice in Miss.
Chief Justice Calls Language in Motion Filed by Attorney
Disrespectful
By Jimmie E. Gates
The Clarion Ledger
February 4, 2005
Mississippi - The state Supreme Court has revoked the rights of a
Florida lawyer to practice in the state for a year because of
language in a motion seeking the recusal of Justice Jess Dickinson.
The court ordered the sanctions against James R. Hubbard of West
Palm Beach, Fla.
The motion asking for reconsideration of a court decision "contained
unfounded and disrespectful charges against Dickinson," Chief
Justice Jim Smith wrote in the order revoking Hubbard's legal
privileges.
The court took exception to the
phrase: "One of the two defendants in this case was the highest
bidder in the election campaign of Justice Dickinson."
That statement was included in a motion filed by Jackson attorney
Dana Kelly following a quotation from a June editorial in The
Clarion-Ledger in which the newspaper said, "Our judicial elections
have become highest-bidder exercises."
In September, Hubbard and Kelly
argued Dickinson received a campaign contribution from one of the
defendants in a lawsuit involving a stock dispute case, William D.
Mounger II.
Mounger and his father each donated $5,000 - the maximum allowed by
law - to Dickinson's campaign in 2002, according to records in the
Secretary of State's office. The younger Mounger was a defendant in
the case.
Kelly is also facing possible sanctions from the court. The court
conducted a sanction hearing Jan. 13 on Kelly but has yet to file an
order, court spokeswoman Beverly Kraft said.
Kelly couldn't be reached for
comment.
Hubbard said the case was the only one he had handled in
Mississippi.
"It's a sensitive issue; we thought
the briefs were appropriate," Hubbard said Wednesday. "We were just
representing our client. We didn't say anyone had done anything
wrong. It was just the appearance of it."
Hubbard said in his 33 years of law practice he has never had
anything like that happen to him.
"You don't like to be criticized by any court," Hubbard said.
Smith wrote: "When Mr. Hubbard was
given an opportunity to disassociate himself with the language of
the motion for reconsideration, he failed to do so; rather, he
adopted in full the disrespectful language, without apology or an
expression of regret."
Smith said the court's action was necessary to prevent recurrence of
such behavior.
Hubbard and Kelly represented Edwin
Welsh in the dispute with a former employer.
The state Supreme Court upheld a lower court's ruling that went
against Welsh. The motion wanted the court to reconsider its
decision, but the court rejected it.
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Lawyer's "Vile,"
"Revolting"
Remarks About Judges Protected Speech
By The Associated Press
November 24, 2004
LANSING, Mich.
-- The state Attorney Discipline Board has dismissed a
charge of professional misconduct against Geoffrey
Fieger, ruling that his ``revolting'' and ``vile''
out-of-court remarks about appeals court judges are
protected by the First Amendment.
In an opinion
published Nov. 8, the board voted 5-3 in favor of Fieger,
a former candidate for governor whose clients have
included assisted-suicide advocate Dr. Jack Kevorkian.
The charge
stems from comments the combative lawyer made while
hosting a radio show in 1999. According to the board, he
used an obscenity for three Michigan judges who had
ruled against one of his clients, and he likened them to
Nazis.
Responding to a
suggestion by a co-host that the court's opinion was
``innuendo,'' Fieger said: ``I know the only thing
that's in their `endo' should be a large, you know,
plunger about the size of, you know, my fist.''
Fieger, a
partner at Fieger, Kenney and Johnson, pleaded
no contest to the charge and agreed to a public
reprimand on the condition he could appeal on
constitutional grounds.
The board
concluded that the First Amendment right to free speech
protects lawyers from being disciplined for expressing
their opinion outside the context of a legal proceeding.
However, the
board described his language as "revolting'' and
scolded Fieger for making ``base, vile, destructive ...
and quite ineffective'' comments.
Fieger has
previously been the subject of commission complaints
over comments about other judges and one former
prosecutor.
Sanctioned Lawyer Vows to Continue Feud With Judge
By Keith
Griffin
The
Connecticut Law Tribune
October 13, 2004
Joseph J. Notopoulos's
enmity toward retired West Hartford Probate Judge John
A. Berman hasn't diminished with the passage of the
time, nor with defeats at the trial and appeals court
levels.
In a decision officially
released Oct. 5, the Appellate Court upheld the
reprimand Notopoulos received for a poison-pen letter he
wrote to Berman during a probate dispute over his
mother's estate. But Notopoulos remains undeterred and
hopes to bring his fight to the state Supreme Court, he
said.
The Appellate Court
split 2-1 over the issue. Judges Paul M. Foti and Anne
C. Dranginis concurred that the Statewide Grievance
Committee had proven there was "clear and convincing
evidence" that Notopoulos, a Hartford Judicial District
magistrate and non-practicing attorney, violated rule
8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rule
bars lawyers from making statements intended to disrupt
a tribunal and from engaging in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice.
Notopoulos had argued
before the Appellate Court that his comments were made
as a private citizen, not as an attorney, and that his
free speech rights were violated as a result of the
sanction.
"Regrettably, as was the
case with the trial court, the Appellate Court has
likewise proved to be an artful dodger of the
controlling federal precedent placed before it," he said
in a written statement to the Law Tribune.
Before the Appellate
Court, Notopoulos cited a 1974 decision in Polk v.
The State Bar of Texas. In that case, plaintiff Ed
J. Polk, a licensed Texas attorney, was sanctioned by
bar officials for comments he made to the news media
following his arrest on drunk driving charges, which
included calling a judge "perverse." A federal judge
found the reprimand violated Polk's First Amendment
rights.
In the majority opinion,
Foti wrote that lawyer ethics rules apply to Notopoulos
even if he was acting as a private citizen when he wrote
his letter to Berman. "Because there is no indication
that rule 8.2 (a) is applicable solely to an attorney
acting in his or her professional capacity, we cannot
conclude that the court improperly applied it to the
plaintiff," he wrote.
In his dissent, Judge
Barry R. Schaller said the SGC had the responsibility of
proving that Notopoulos's claim that Berman was guilty
of criminal extortion wasn't true. "The plaintiff's
explanations of his observations and conclusions that
charging fees, 'threatening' a mental examination of his
mother and asserting that a substantial cash bond could
be imposed were sufficient, in my view, to shift the
burden of evidence back to the committee," Schaller
wrote.
Foti disagreed with
Schaller.
"The plaintiff must
provide evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that
the statements were true," he held.
Lawyer Sanctioned for Critical Barbs
Calls One Judge’s Decision ‘‘Disgrace to the Human
Race’’
By David L. Hudson Jr.
American Bar Journal
October 1, 2004
A Tennessee lawyer who compared a ruling in one of his
cases with the Dred Scott decision upholding slavery
crossed the line into "the quagmire of unprotected
speech," the Tennessee Supreme Court recently ruled.
A lawyer who criticizes
the judicial system and its officers in courtroom
proceedings may be sanctioned for intemperate speech,
the court said in ordering a two-year suspension for
lawyer Edward A. Slavin Jr.
Board of
Professional Respon-sibility of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee v. Slavin,
No. M2003-00845-SC-R3-BP (Aug. 27).
However, the court said
Slavin may apply for reinstatement after one year. That
doesn’t satisfy Slavin, who says he will try to take his
case to U.S. Supreme Court. "I still believe in a place
called hope, and I look forward to vindication by the
courts and by history," he says.
The controversy concerns
several complaints about Slavin, who has been licensed
to practice law in the state of Tennessee since 1987 and
has represented numerous whistle-blowers battling
federal agencies.
Among those who filed
complaints against Slavin were a chancellor for the
Sixth Judicial District in Tennessee, a federal district
court judge and two administrative law judges.
Among other things, the
complainants accused Slavin of:
•• Filing pleadings
that called a recommended decision "a stench in the
nostrils of the nation" and claiming that an
administrative judge "disgraces his judicial office."
•• Asserting that an
administrative review board decision "ranks with the
Dred Scott decision among the injustices of American
history" and is "a disgrace to the human race."
Slavin was also accused
of ignoring orders of a court, making false statements,
failing to communicate with clients and using the
judicial peer review process to try to win reversals on
questions of law.
Before the case reached
the Tennessee Supreme Court, Chancellor Richard E. Ladd
of the Second Judicial District found Slavin in
violation of nearly all the charges. He concluded
Slavin’s actions were not protected by the First
Amendment and ordered that he be suspended from law
practice for three years.
In its Aug. 27 opinion,
the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that Slavin’s
comments were not protected speech. The court cited a
1996 Kentucky Supreme Court opinion for its language:
"There can never be a justification for a lawyer to use
such scurrilous language with respect to a judge in
pleadings or in open court."
"Accordingly, we
conclude that Slavin’s in-court remarks were not
protected by the First Amendment," the Tennessee Supreme
Court wrote. "By this holding, we intend to limit an
attorney’s criticisms of the judicial system and its
officers to those criticisms which are consistent in
every way with the sweep and the spirit of the Rules of
Professional Conduct."
The court concluded:
"Although we are much impressed with Slavin’s intellect
and legal skill, what does not impress us is his
apparent defiance in refusing to respect the line
separating, in the judicial context, tolerable criticism
from unacceptable speech. He has trampled upon that
line, and indeed by so doing has propelled himself into
the quagmire of unacceptable speech."
The court distinguished
its 1989 decision in Ramsey v. Board of Professional
Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 116, which held that an
attorney’s out-of-court statements to the media
regarding judicial proceedings were protected by the
First Amendment. In Slavin’s case, the court said, his
statements were instead made during in-court judicial
proceedings and could be sanctioned.
Laura L. Chastain, the
deputy chief disciplinary counsel for the Tennessee
Board of Professional Responsibility, who argued the
case, was pleased that the court had made a distinction
between out-of-court and in-court statements. "The
state’s interest in this case involved the integrity of
the judicial system," she says. "The judicial system
itself becomes suspect in the public’s eye when the
judiciary is subjected to such criticism and personal
attacks, without a reasonable basis."
Slavin disagreed with
the decision and the characterization that his
statements were in-court statements. "Many, if not all,
of the statements in question were out-of-court
statements," he says. "Their complaint is that I
complained. There is abroad in the land today a movement
by large organizations to stifle criticism."
He questioned whether
the Tennessee Supreme Court decision gives proper
guidance to attorneys as to what they can and cannot
say. "What attorney reading this decision would know
what they could and couldn’’t say when representing a
whistle-blower or any other person going up against a
large organization?"
Nahum Litt, former chief
judge of the Department of Labor, supports Slavin, one
of his former law clerks.
"My position is that he
has been unfairly persecuted," says Litt, who was a fact
and expert witness for Slavin in the case. "He is a
difficult advocate and will confront judges. But he
should have the right to confront judges."
"I think the decision is
a definite loss for lawyers’’ speech," says David A.
Stuart, a Clinton, Tenn., attorney who is assisting
Slavin with his case. "I think it sends a pretty
powerful message about what lawyers cannot say about
judges and how they say things about judges and other
lawyers."
One legal expert
questioned whether the decision gave enough guidance as
to what attorney speech crosses the line.
"I think the opinion
doesn’t necessarily provide the clearest line of
demarcation between what is acceptable criticism and
what is unacceptable criticism of the judiciary, because
in this area those lines are oftentimes murky," says
Peter Joy, a law professor at the Washington University
in St. Louis. "The opinion, while it cites a lot of
instances of Slavin’s critical speech, doesn’t draw the
line clearly enough about which statements of Slavin's
crossed the line and which did not."
Joy adds that
"statements that directly attack a judge’s ability to
handle a case or do his or her job are generally
considered off-limits.
NY Lawyer Fights Disciplinary Probe
By John Caher
New York Lawyer
New York Law Journal
September 30, 2004
ALBANY An
ethics complaint against attorney John A. Aretakis is
raising questions about a disciplinary body's ability to
litigate what amounts to a slander allegation, and the
right of an attorney to publicly disseminate a
misconduct complaint.
Mr. Aretakis, a
Manhattan and Albany area plaintiff's attorney
specializing in clergy abuse cases, this week challenged
the Third Department's Committee on Professional
Standards.
He contends the
disciplinary agency has neither the jurisdiction nor the
capacity to determine the validity of what at its core
is a defamation action. And he also claims, contrary to
the committee's position, that he has a right to make
such a complaint public.
The dispute
stems from comments made by Mr. Aretakis at a May
meeting of the Coalition of Concerned Catholics of the
Albany Diocese, a conservative group that has been
critical of the diocesan leadership.
At that
meeting, Mr. Aretakis accused the Reverend Carl A. Urban
of numerous sexual improprieties and implicated the
diocese and its bishop in a cover-up. Mr. Aretakis does
not deny making those accusations and has publicly
repeated them on several occasions.
Reverend Urban
contends the allegations are "absolutely false" and
defamatory. However, instead of commencing a slander
action which Mr. Aretakis dared him to do at the
meeting the priest took his complaint to the Third
Department's Committee on Professional Standards.
"My purpose is
to ask this Committee to investigate the conduct of this
man and to protect innocent persons, like myself, from
his public pronouncements of vindictive hate and
salacious lies," Reverend Urban said in a complaint that
was made public by Mr. Aretakis.
Often,
observers said, an ethics complaint predicated on an
underlying tort is left to the Civil Court since a
disciplinary panel could then rely on the court action
to prosecute a misconduct charge.
In the case of
Mr. Aretakis, the Third Department panel has apparently
decided to proceed in the absence of a civil action.
That means the committee may have to prosecute a
defamation case, acting in essence as counsel for the
complainant.
In his Sept. 27
response to the ethics complaint, Mr. Aretakis observes
that truth is an absolute defense and notes that the
committee cannot find him guilty of misconduct without
first finding that he slandered the priest. That, he
said, it is neither authorized nor equipped to do.
No First Amendment Protection for Lawyer's Rants
Scott Brede
The Connecticut Law Tribune
October 13, 2003
An attorney's poison-pen letter to former West Hartford
Probate Judge John A. Berman is not protected free
speech, a Connecticut Superior Court judge ruled late
last month, upholding a reprimand lodged against Joseph
Notopoulos.
The West Hartford, Conn., lawyer had argued that he
wrote and sent the letter in his capacity as a private
citizen, not a member of the bar, and therefore
shouldn't be disciplined under ethics rules prohibiting
attorneys from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice or making statements intended
to disrupt a tribunal.
But ruling in Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance
Committee, New Britain Superior Court Judge William
P. Murray found otherwise. "The Rules of Professional
Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in
accordance with high standards in both their personal
and professional lives," wrote Murray citing appellate
rulings in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Egbarin
and Statewide Grievance Committee v. Scluger.
Murray also disagreed with Notopoulos' claim that his
criticisms -- which included his contention that Berman
had "prostituted the integrity of his office" -- were
absolutely protected under the First Amendment. "In the
context of disciplinary proceedings, an attorney's right
to free speech must be balanced with the state's
interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial
system," Murray wrote. " ... Here, the significant state
interest in preserving public confidence in the judicial
system outweighs the free speech rights of Notopoulos to
make reckless accusations about the integrity of a
probate judge."
In an interview, Notopoulos said the decision amounts to
unlawful censorship, and ignores controlling federal
case law.
In his decision, Murray didn't address the main case
Notopoulos cited in appealing the grievance committee's
reprimand: the 1974 federal court ruling in Polk v.
The State Bar of Texas. In that case, plaintiff Ed
J. Polk, a licensed Texas attorney, was sanctioned by
bar officials for comments he made to the news media
following his arrest on drunk driving charges, which
included calling a judge "perverse." Finding Polk's
reprimand violated his free-speech rights, U.S. District
Court Judge Robert M. Dunn wrote, "This court rejects
the contention...that in order to maintain the general
esteem of the public in the legal profession ... conduct
of an attorney in all matters must be above and beyond
that conduct of nonlawyers."
Murray's decision, Notopoulos warned, could have
negative implications for non-practicing lawyers who, in
seeking elective office, engage in political mudslinging
or take governmental entities to task. "I can safely
predict that the more vocal non-practicing Connecticut
lawyers, such as Bill Curry, Ralph Nader and Joe
Lieberman, will be astonished to learn that they've
surrendered their First Amendment rights to the state of
Connecticut as punishment ... for having passed the
state bar," he said.
Murray, however, noted that Notopoulos had other more
effective options at his disposal, such as bringing his
complaints about Berman to the Council on Probate
Judicial Conduct, but failed to avail himself of them.
Angered by Berman's 1999 decision to appoint a former
accountant as his dying mother's conservator, Notopoulos
fired off correspondence to the West Hartford Probate
Court in September 2000 accusing Berman of running "a
financial spoils system for the cronies he calls his
'professional conservators.'" Notopoulos also sent
copies of the letter to his brother and a local
physician, according to the reviewing panel that heard
the complaint subsequently lodged by Berman.
Murray said Notopoulos may have escaped the grievance
committee's ire had his criticisms stuck to his concerns
over the conservator's appointment. "Notopoulos,
however, personally attacked Judge Berman and the West
Hartford Probate Court and ascribed actions and motives
to Judge Berman totally unsupportive of any evidence,"
Murray wrote.
Notopoulos denied his claims were unsubstantiated. He is
considering a further appeal, but acknowledged the
reprimand has "little consequence to me because I'm a
non-practicing lawyer." He serves as a Hartford Judicial
District magistrate, he said.
"I'm tempted to let [Murray's ruling] stand," Notopoulos
added, "as a monument to flawed jurisprudence."
Footnote Gets a Lawyer Suspended
State Justices Rule it Impugned Appeals Panel
By Gary Young
Staff Reporter
National Law Journal
November 11, 2002
A sharply worded footnote
in a legal brief has cost an Indiana attorney a one-month suspension
from the practice of law.
In a 3-2 decision, the
Indiana Supreme Court said that Michael A. Wilkins impugned the
integrity of the Indiana Court of Appeals by suggesting that one of
its opinions was results-driven.
Under Indiana rules,
Wilkins, a partner in the Indianapolis firm Ice Miller, must notify
his clients of the suspension and close up shop for one month. In re
Wilkins, No. 49S00-0005-DI-341 (Oct. 29, 2002).
The case has drawn
controversy not only because it raises questions about the
free-speech rights of attorneys, but because one of the judges who
voted for Wilkins' suspension, Justice Robert D. Rucker, served on
the Court of Appeals until 1999 and had a hand in the decision that
Wilkins criticized.
Rucker told the
Indianapolis Star on Nov. 5 that he might have removed himself from
the case if he had recalled his involvement. Wilkins' attorney, G.
Daniel Kelley Jr., also of Ice Miller, said that he did not ask
Rucker to recuse himself, but declined to comment why.
In 1997, Wilkins signed on
as local counsel to Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. in a dispute with
an Indiana bowling alley over insurance coverage. A three-judge
panel of the court of appeals ruled against Michigan Mutual in 1999,
with Rucker concurring. Michigan Mutual's lead counsel, Jeffrey R.
Learned of the Southfield, Mich., firm Morrison, Mahoney & Miller,
wrote a brief urging the Supreme Court to take review. In a
footnote, Learned wrote that the court of appeals opinion "is so
factually and legally inaccurate that one is left to wonder whether
the Court of Appeals was determined to find for [Michigan Mutual's
opponent] and then said whatever was necessary to reach that
conclusion."
The Supreme Court declined
to review the case and struck the brief from the record, describing
the footnote (in 1999) as "a scurrilous and intemperate attack on
the integrity of the Court of Appeals."
Soon after, the Supreme
Court's Disciplinary Commission began an investigation. In its Oct.
29 decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Wilkins was not the
author of the footnote, but said he took responsibility by signing
and submitting Learned's brief. Charges are still pending against
Learned. His attorney, Kevin P. McGoff of Indianapolis' Kiefer and
McGoff, said that Learned has agreed to accept a public reprimand,
but that the Supreme Court has not yet approved the deal.
Wilkins was suspended under
a disciplinary rule drawn from the ABA's model code and widely
adopted by state and federal courts. Indiana Professional Conduct
Rule 8.2(a) states that a "lawyer shall not make a statement that
the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to the
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge."
In briefs, Kelley attacked
on several fronts. He argued, among other things, that the footnote
did not fall under the rule because it was statement of opinion, not
of fact. He claimed that "result-
driven" was commonly
understood by lawyers and judges as a criticism of a certain kind of
legal reasoning, not of the integrity of the reasoner. He also
argued that a suspension would violate Wilkins' First Amendment
right to free speech.
In their opinion, the
Supreme Court majority did not address the fact/opinion distinction
or the degree to which the lower court's opinion may in fact have
been results-driven and claimed that Wilkins had adduced no
authority in support of his First Amendment argument.
W. Bradley Wendel, a
professor at Washington and Lee School of Law, has argued in a law
review article that court-crafted restrictions on attorney speech
often infringe the First Amendment.
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[Index
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